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CHAPTER I
Why Do the Insured Use More Health Care? The Role of
Insurance-Induced Unhealthy Behavior
1.1 Introduction
There is a large literature examining the eﬀect of health insurance on health care.
This literature generally shows that health insurance is associated with an increased
use of health care, though the direction of causality and the ultimate eﬀect on health
are questionable.
Traditionally, researchers focus on two scenarios: First, individuals buying health
insurance are likely to be those who anticipate greater need of health care. This
is frequently referred to as adverse selection. Statistically, this means that insured
individuals are a non-randomly selected sample of the population. They have observed
and possibly unobserved characteristics that are correlated with a higher demand for
medical care. Second, health insurance reduces the eﬀective price of health care, so
other things equal, the insured tend to use more health care. For example, individuals
who are just indiﬀerent between using and not using a certain medical service at
uninsured rates will tend to use it if they have insurance. This is a direct price eﬀect.
However, there is a third dimension to this issue: due to moral hazard, individuals
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once insured may become less cautious about their unhealthy or risky behaviors, which
lead to more health problems, requiring more health care.1 That is, individuals may
respond to their insurance status and change behaviors, and thereby consume more
health care.
This paper takes a structural point of view and investigates the direct and indi-
rect health insurance eﬀects on care utilization, controlling for the selection eﬀect.
The adverse selection eﬀect is a causal relationship running from potentially higher
health care utilization to health insurance; whereas both the indirect eﬀect that works
through health-related behaviors and the direct price eﬀect are causalities running
from health insurance to higher care utilization. Even if the adverse selection is ac-
counted for by econometric techniques or experimental designs, the latter two eﬀects
can not be separated without looking at the simultaneous relationships among health
insurance, behaviors, and health care utilization.
Intuitively, health insurance may encourage individuals to engage in unhealthy be-
haviors, such as heavy drinking, because it lowers the oﬀsetting cost of the negative
health consequences associated with these unhealthy behaviors and may even make
otherwise unaﬀordable medical care accessible. In addition, individuals with chronic
diseases are more likely to rely on medication instead of behavioral improvement once
the medication becomes cheaper. This is especially true when considering the emo-
tional costs that behavioral improvement requires. Further, more accessible health
care or treatments may distort the perceived risk of unhealthy activities, which can
lead to less cautious behavior.
1Commonly studied unhealthy behaviors are: drinking, smoking, inadequate physical activity, and unhealthy diet.
This paper focuses on the ﬁrst three types of unhealthy behavior, because there is no diet information available in
the data set used.
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Some may argue that moral hazard may not be important in the health insurance
context, because it only reduces the ﬁnancial cost of illness, while health is irreplace-
able. However, as Dave and Kaestner (2006) point out, this rationale fails to explain
ﬁndings in other insurance contexts involving adverse health consequences. For ex-
ample, they note an increase in car accidents when car insurance is more generous,
and an increase in workplace injuries associated with increases in workers’ injury
compensation.
The disincentive eﬀect of health insurance on individuals’ healthy behaviors is de-
ﬁned as “behavioral moral hazard” in this paper. In contrast, “direct price eﬀect”
refers to health insurance lowering the price of medical care and hence inducing indi-
viduals to use more care ceteris paribus.2 Although both may lead to increased health
care utilization, their ultimate eﬀects on health are diﬀerent. In the former case, the
increased use of health care does not necessarily translate into better health because
individuals actually need more health care; whereas in the latter case, increased health
care is more likely to improve health.
An immediate policy implication is that mandating insurance coverage to improve
a targeted population’s health status may not be fully eﬃcient. The eﬃciency in part
depends on how much individuals substitute medication for behavioral improvement.
For example, Klick and Stratmann (2006) examine the eﬀect of mandates in some
states that required health insurance providers to cover diabetes treatment with-
2These two terms are related to but not quite the same as the existing ex ante and ex post moral hazard concepts
in health economics. Ex ante moral hazard refers to the moral hazard that takes place before a sickness episode,
which is further classiﬁed into self-insurance (demand for preventive care) and self-protection (exercising, abstention
from smoking etc). Ex post moral hazard refers to moral hazard that takes place after a sickness episode, i.e., using
more health care when one gets sick. Here the focus is on distinguishing two diﬀerent ways that health insurance
may cause increased demand of medical care and exploring their relative roles. I consider the direct price eﬀect as a
rational economic behavior, i.e., individuals’ natural response to decreased prices of health care. It can be predicted
ex ante by examining the price elasticity of care.
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out increasing premiums. Their study shows that these mandates generate strong
disincentives for individuals’ behavioral prevention and systematically increase the
diabetics’ BMI in the aﬀected states, which is taken as a result of engaging in worse
diet and exercise practice. Therefore, distinguishing the two eﬀects may further shed
light on policy relevant parameters.
Distinguishing the two eﬀects may also help explain a puzzle in the literature:
while a lot of research shows that health insurance results in increased use of health
care, there is little evidence that having heath insurance leads to improved health
(Haas et al., 1993a, b, Perry and Rosen, 2001). Findings from the RAND Health
Insurance Experiment (Newhouse, 1993) show that those for whom health care was
free used about 40% more health services than those who had some cost sharing, but
this resulted in “little or no measurable eﬀect on health status for the average adult.”
This paper sets up a two-period dynamic forward-looking model, which incorpo-
rates rational addiction (Becker and Murphy, 1988), uncertainty, and marginal utility
of consumption depending on health status. From the theoretical model, this paper
derives the structural causal relationships among health behaviors (drinking, smok-
ing, and exercise), medical utilization, and the decision to buy health insurance. The
structural equations show that exogenous changes in the price of health insurance and
past behaviors can help identify the direct and indirect eﬀects of health insurance on
medical utilization. Semi-reduced form equations are used in the empirical analysis.
It is also shown that the structural parameter of interest, the direct and indirect
eﬀects of health insurance, can be recovered from the reduced-from parameters.
The data used in this study are from the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
The HRS is a panel data set, so one can control for past health behaviors, which
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is important because of state dependence or the addictiveness of health behaviors.
The empirical analysis adopts the generalized Tobit or sample selection speciﬁca-
tion with transformations on the dependent and lagged dependent variables. Such a
speciﬁcation deals with typical features of data on medical utilization and unhealthy
behaviors, i.e., a large proportion of zero observations and a highly skewed distri-
bution of positive observations. It also separately accounts for the extensive margin
(changes in the percentage of individuals who participate in unhealthy behaviors) and
the intensive margin (changes in the quantity of unhealthy behaviors by participants)
of the insurance eﬀect, which turns out to be empirically important.
Health insurance is found to encourage less healthy behavior, particularly heavy
drinking, but this does not yield a short term perceptible increase in doctor or hospital
visits. The eﬀects of health insurance are primarily found at the intensive margin, e.g.,
health insurance may not cause a non-drinker to take up drinking, while it encourages
a heavy drinker to drink even more. These results suggest that to counteract the be-
havioral moral hazard, health insurance should be coupled with incentives that target
individuals who currently engage in unhealthy behaviors, such as heavy drinkers.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section
3 sets up the theoretical model. Section 4 describes the features of data on medical
utilization and unhealthy behaviors, as well as discusses the empirical speciﬁcation.
Section 5 describes the sample and addresses identiﬁcation of the eﬀects of health
insurance. Empirical results are reported in Section 6, and concluding remarks are
provided in Section 7.
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1.2 Literature Review
There are a large number of studies examining the insurance eﬀect on health care
utilization (See Zweifel and Manning, 2000 and Buchmueller et al, 2005 for surveys
on this literature). They do not consider the potential eﬀect of health insurance on
individuals’ health behaviors and how that further aﬀects medical utilization. Below
is an illustration of (1) the focus of this literature versus (2) the focus here.
Health 
Insurance
Use of  
Health Care 
Selection Effect 
(Ex post) Moral Hazard  
Health 
Insurance
Use of  
Health Care 
Selection Effect 
Direct Price Effect 
Health Related 
Behaviors 
True Moral Hazard  
(1) Causalities traditionally studied (2) A fuller view of causalities  
Selection Effect 
A small strand of literature examines ex ante moral hazard, whereas the majority
examines the eﬀect of health insurance coverage on the receipt of preventative care,
such as mammography, and prostate or cholesterol screening. These studies include
Roddy et al. (1986), Lillard et al. (1986), Keeler and Rolph (1988), Cherkin et al.
(1990), McWilliams et al. (2003), and Decker (2005). In addition, Kenkel (2000)
examines the eﬀect of health insurance on the use of preventive care as well as on
health behaviors. Based on logit model estimation, Kenkel’s study suggests that
people with private health insurance are more likely to engage in health promoting
behaviors than those without insurance. However, the author points out that these
results may be biased if insurance status is endogenous to health practices. Courbage
and Coulon (2004) examine whether purchasing additional private health insurance
modiﬁes the probability of exercising, smoking and undergoing regular check-ups in
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the UK.3 Using Probit and instrumental variable estimation, they ﬁnd that having
additional private insurance may in fact lead to healthier choices.
Card et al. (2004) separately examine the eﬀect of Medicare eligibility on a large
range of mostly discrete outcomes: usage of medical procedures, smoking, exercise,
as well as self-reported health, obesity, and mortality rates. Their study exploits
the exogenous increase in health insurance coverage at age 65, which is the Medicare
eligible age. They show that eligibility for Medicare has a signiﬁcant impact on health
care utilization and a discernable eﬀect on self-reported health, though reaching age 65
has no systematic eﬀect on mortality rate and on probabilities of smoking, exercising
and being obese.
Khwaja (2002, 2006) looks at individuals’ health insurance decisions, health habits,
and care utilization simultaneously, but does not consider the magnitude of the direct
price eﬀect versus the indirect behavioral moral hazard eﬀect within the total eﬀect of
health insurance. Using a dynamic programming approach, Khwaja (2002) estimates
dynamic discrete choice models and conducts simulations based estimated parameters.
His study concludes that insurance coverage causes insigniﬁcant moral hazard in
probabilities of having habits like smoking and drinking, and signiﬁcant moral hazard
in the probability of seeking medical treatment. Using the same approach, Khwaja
(2006) ﬁnds that Medicare generates a low level of moral hazard in the probabilities
of alcohol consumption, smoking and exercise among the elderly.
To summarize, most existing studies consider the insurance eﬀect either on medi-
cal utilization or on health behaviors, but do not look at the simultaneous structural
relationships among health insurance, behaviors and health care utilization. A few
3Public health insurance is provided to all residents in the UK.
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studies that do consider all three do not separate the direct and indirect insurance
eﬀects, which have important policy implications as discussed earlier. These studies
also focus on discrete outcomes, i.e., they examine the insurance eﬀect on the proba-
bility of having an unhealthy habit rather than the quantity. These studies ﬁnd that
health insurance does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of participating
in unhealthy behavior (extensive margin); however, it is reasonable to believe that,
given participation, health insurance may have a nonnegligible eﬀect on the quantity
of unhealthy behavior (intensive margin). For example, health insurance may not in-
duce a non-smoker to become a smoker, while it is likely to aﬀect how much a smoker
smokes. Looking at discrete outcomes fails to identify the empirically important
intensive margin of the insurance eﬀect, which may lead to misleading conclusions
about the behavioral moral hazard eﬀect.
In contrast to the previous literature, this paper presents a dynamic continuous
choice model and derives the structural causal relationships among health-related be-
haviors like drinking, health care utilization, and the decision to buy health insurance.
This allows identiﬁcation of both the direct price and indirect moral hazard eﬀects of
health insurance on medical utilization. Using quantitative instead of just qualitative
data, this paper determines both the extensive and intensive margins of insurance
eﬀects. Distinguishing the price and behavioral moral hazard eﬀects as well as the
extensive and intensive margins provide more policy relevant implications than ex-
isting studies. For example, if health insurance makes drinkers drink more, but does
not cause people to take up drinking, then policies should target current drinkers.
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1.3 Theoretical Model
This section sets up a theoretical model and derives the structural causal rela-
tionships for the insurance decision, health behaviors, and medical utilization. Semi-
reduced form equations are then obtained for health behaviors and medical utilization.
Based on the relationship between the structural equations and the semi-reduced form
equations, the structural parameters of interest, the direct and indirect insurance ef-
fects, are recovered from the reduced-form parameters. To keep the discussion short,
derivation details are provided in the Appendix.
1.3.1 The Basic Theoretical Model
As Grossman (1972) and many others have noted, consumers value health. Better
health may improve the eﬃciency of other goods consumption, whereas health care
is merely a means to producing health or slowing its decline. Therefore, this paper
assumes that a typical individual draws utility from his health, composite goods
consumption and unhealthy behaviors. The unhealthy behaviors under consideration
include drinking, smoking and insuﬃcient physical activity. Unhealthy behaviors are
addictive. Besides utility, they also generate disutility through their harmful eﬀects
on health.
Here health is viewed as a durable consumption good with value that depreciates
with age. An individual may invest in health using medical care and health behaviors,
and the individual is exposed to stochastic health shocks. That is, the individual’s
health evolves according to4
(1.1) Ht+1 = δHt + H˜(Mt,Bt, st),
4For convenience of notation, an individual subscript is dropped from all the equations. Throughout the paper,
boldfaced letters are used to denote vectors or matrices, and regular letters to denote scalars.
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where Ht = initial health status in period t; H˜ = health production function; δ = 1
- health depreciation rate; Mt = medical care; Bt = (B
1
t , B
2
t , B
3
t )
′, a vector of health
behaviors with three elements representing alcohol drinking, smoking, and exercise,
respectively; st = health shock.
Individual heterogeneity (e.g., diﬀerent genes) is not included explicitly in health
production, because it can not be distinguished from individual permanent taste or
ﬁxed eﬀects in the utility function. Instead of having ﬁxed eﬀects in the health
production function H˜, this study later includes ﬁxed eﬀects in the utility function .
The health shock st could be any acute diseases, such as a heart attack, or injury.
st may depend on health behaviors Bt and initial health status Ht, which allows the
incidence (probability of st greater than 0) and severity (expected value of st) of the
health shock to be a function of Bt and Ht. For example, if the individual is in
bad health or engages in unhealthy behaviors excessively, he will be more vulnerable
to health stocks. By this construction, Bt may have a short-term eﬀect on health
by inducing a health shock immediately and a long-term eﬀect by reducing the next
period health stock Ht+1, regardless of the health shock. Health care Mt may mitigate
the negative health eﬀects of behaviors Bt and those of the shock st.
Given the potential addictiveness of unhealthy behaviors such as drinking and
smoking, it is assumed that the marginal utility of current unhealthy behaviors Bt
depends on past unhealthy behaviors Bt−1 (Becker and Murphy, 1988; Becker, Gross-
man and Murphy, 1994). Therefore, both Bt and Bt−1 enter the current period t
utility function.
The individual is assumed to be forward-looking; i.e., he cares about the addictive-
ness and negative health eﬀects of his current unhealthy behaviors. For simplicity,
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assume that the individual, characterized by a ﬁxed taste parameter τ ,5 lives for two
periods, t and t+1, representing the present and future, respectively. The individual
invests in health in period t, and bears the addiction and adverse health consequences
in period t+1. There is no health investment in the second period, as the individual
is no longer living afterwards.
In addition to health shocks, there are taste shifters. Taste shifters are revealed
to the individual at the beginning of each period, so the individual knows his exact
preference when he makes decisions. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that
health shocks come in the middle of each period.6 In particular, it is assumed that
when the individual makes his health behavior decisions, health shocks are unknown,
while when he make his medical utilization decision, the health shock in that period
has resolved.
The individual’s decision-making is a three-stage procedure in the two periods. At
the beginning of period t, the individual decides whether to buy insurance. Assume
that he knows his current preference νt, health status Ht, and habits Bt−1. Uncer-
tainty arises because the current period health shock st and the future shocks, taste
shifter νt+1 and health shock st+1, are unknown. The individual makes his insurance
decision based on expected utility maximization. Then with his insurance status
determined, the individual chooses his health behaviors Bt, medical care Mt, and
composite goods consumption Ct. At the beginning of period t + 1, the individual’s
taste shifter νt+1 is revealed to him, and he enjoys a health status Ht+1 determined
5Later τ is parameterized as a function of some fundamental individual characteristics, such as race, gender,
education etc. It can also be taken directly as a vector of individual characteristics.
6Additional health shocks could also come at the beginning of a period, i.e., before the individual makes behavior
decisions, and hence would aﬀect these decisions. In my model these beginning of the period of health shocks would
be indistinguishable from the taste shifter, so one could just take these health shocks to be one dimension of the taste
shifter.
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by his initial health status Ht, ﬁrst period health inputs Mt and Bt, and health shock
st. The individual decides health behaviors Bt+1 and composite goods consumption
Ct+1.
For computational tractability and simplicity, assume that utility is additively sep-
arable over time and that in each period it has a quasi-linear representation. Further,
assume that the time preference rate equals the interest rate r. The individual’s
utility function can then be written as,
(1.2) Ct + U(Bt−1,Bt, Ht, τ , νt, st) + β[Ct+1 + U(Bt,Bt+1, Ht+1, τ , νt+1, st+1)],
subject to the budget constraint
(1.3) (Ct + PItIt +P
′
BBt + (1− dIt)Mt) + β(Ct+1 +P′BBt+1) = Wt,
where Bt, Ht, and st are deﬁned as in equation (1.1); β = 1/(1 + r) is the discount
factor; Ct = composite goods consumption, which is a numeraire; τ = ﬁxed taste
parameter; νt = taste shifter; Wt = present value of total wealth; It = insurance
dummy; PIt = insurance premium; PB = (P
1
B, P
2
B, P
3
B)
′ is the price vector for health
behaviors; d = insurer co-payment rate, with d ∈ (0, 1].
The quasi-linear utility assumption greatly simpliﬁes the model solution by omit-
ting wealth eﬀects on the individual’s choices. Since wealth eﬀects drop out, how
wealth is determined has no impact here. Therefore, the total wealth Wt is not
explicitly modeled.7 However, income will later be included as one dimension of in-
dividual characteristics, so in the empirical speciﬁcation, choices will still depend on
income.
7For a general utility function, having Wt be a function of current and expected future behaviors and health, and
hence a function of medical care Mt, would not change the ultimate functional forms of Bt, Mt and It. However,
past behavior could aﬀect Wt, and thereby aﬀect all the individual’s choices here. Since it could only do so through
past incomes, or more precisely savings, in this case one could have savings in the eventual behavior and medical
utilization equations, whereas all the other results that follow from this quasi-linear utility would still hold.
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The modeling here focuses on individuals’ choices, i.e., the demand side of the
insurance market, while insurance premiums are determined by both demand and
supply; therefore, I defer the modeling of insurance premiums to later. In particular, it
will be assumed that, as a reduced form, insurance prices are a function of individuals’
age, health condition, habits, and other characteristics as well as unobserved supply
side factors. Since health shocks can generate immediate disutility, st is directly
included in the utility function. For example, the individual suﬀers utility loss from
health shocks, even though medical care may be used to prevent health loss from
those shocks. This discourages the individual from drinking or smoking without a
limit in the last period of life.
In a dynamic forward-looking model, an individual is assumed to take into account
the eﬀect of his current choices on his future course of actions and consistently maxi-
mizes his expected utility over time. The model can therefore be solved by backward
induction. In this paper’s context, the individual’s optimal choices in the second
period are derived ﬁrst, conditioning on his ﬁrst period choices, and then the results
are used to derive his optimal choices in the ﬁrst period, conditional on his insurance
decision at the beginning of this period. Finally, the individual’s insurance decision
is derived based on his expected optimal choices at the following stages.
Substituting the budget constraint into the utility function yields
(1.4)
U(Bt−1,Bt, Ht, τ , νt, st) + βU(Bt,Bt+1, Ht+1, τ , νt+1, st+1)
+Wt − [PItIt +P′BBt + (1− dIt)Mt + βP′BBt+1].
In the second period, the individual chooses Bt+1 to maximize his expected util-
ity given by equation (1.4), conditioning on his then information set Ft+1 = {Bt,
Ht+1, τ , νt+1}. Denote the solution to this maximization problem as B∗t+1 ≡ B∗t+1
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(Bt, Ht+1, τ , νt+1), where Ht+1 = δHt + H˜(Mt,Bt, st). By backward induction, in
the ﬁrst period, the individual chooses health behaviors Bt and medical care uti-
lization Mt to maximize his expected utility now deﬁned by equation (1.4) after
replacing Bt+1 with B
∗
t+1, and conditioning on his information set at this stage,
Ft = {Bt−1, Ht, It, τ , νt}. The ﬁrst order conditions for this maximization problem
yield structural equations for Mt and Bt.
At the beginning of period t, the individual decides whether to buy insurance,
depending on which choice gives the higher expected utility. Therefore, for both
It = 1 and It = 0, substitute into the utility function, equation (1.4), the corre-
sponding optimal choices at the following stages in a backward manner. This yields
the stochastic utility functions in the two cases. Conditional on his information set
F 0t = {Bt−1, Ht, τ , νt}, the individual compares the expected utility in the two cases,
and buys insurance if and only if the expected value of buying health insurance ex-
ceeds that of not buying.
These steps produce structural equations for the insurance decision, health behav-
iors, and health care utilization. The resulting system of structural equations can be
expressed as
(1.5) Mt = fM(It,Bt, Ht, τ , νt, et),
(1.6) Blt = fBl(It,Bt−1,Mt, Ht, τ , νt) for l = 1, 2, 3,
(1.7) It = 1 [fI(Bt−1, Ht, τ , νt)− PIt > 0] ,
where 1[·] is the indicator function that equals one if the bracketed term is true,
and zero otherwise; et is the random component of the health shock, i.e., et =
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st − E(st|Ht,Bt). Let P ∗It = fI(Bt−1, Ht, τ , νt), which is the price that makes the
individual just indiﬀerent between buying and not buying insurance, namely, the in-
dividual’s willingness-to-pay for insurance. Equation (1.7) implies that the individual
buys health insurance if and only if his willingness-to-pay for insurance is higher than
the actual price he needs to pay.
The above system of equations shows that Mt depends on Bt and It, and Bt further
depends on It, so health insurance It can have both direct and indirect eﬀects on
medical utilization Mt. More importantly, these structural equations show exclusion
restrictions for the endogenous variables in the structural Mt equation. First, Bt−1
appears in the structural Bt equations, but not in the structural Mt equation. The
intuition is that past unhealthy behaviors Bt−1 aﬀect Mt only through their eﬀects on
the current health Ht and current unhealthy behaviorsBt. After conditioning on these
two variables, Bt−1 has no direct eﬀect on medical utilization Mt. Alternatively, if two
individuals behave diﬀerently in the past, then this diﬀerence in Bt−1 will be reﬂected
either in Ht or in Bt; i.e., these two measures summarize past behaviors.
8 Second,
PIt shows up only in the insurance equation, so it provides a source of identiﬁcation
for the eﬀects of health insurance. These exclusion restrictions together imply that
the structural Mt equation is identiﬁed. It follows that the structural parameters of
interest, the direct and indirect eﬀects of health insurance, are identiﬁed.9
Equation (1.7) is the individual’s demand function of insurance, where the insur-
8These equations provide a simpliﬁed conceptual framework that can be used to guide empirical analysis. For
example, in theory, equation (1.5) would require a perfect measure for the true health status, including both the
observed component and the unobserved component, which might not be feasible in practice. However, one may
redeﬁne the time dimension so that this assumption can plausibly hold. In particular, one could let Bt be measures
of current health behaviors, which are not necessary those in one year, and Bt−1 be summary measures of behavioral
history that have a suﬃciently long lag so that their eﬀects are already reﬂected in Ht. For example, Bt could be
the average amount of unhealthy behaviors in the most recent three years, and Bt−1 be the averages for the three or
more years further back in time.
9The coeﬃcients in equation (1.6), the structural Bt equation, can not be identiﬁed. However, identifying the
parameters of interest regarding insurance eﬀects does not require identifying the structural Bt equation.
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ance price is endogenously determined. For simplicity, a reduced-form function is used
for the insurance price. Given that insurance companies in general charge new cus-
tomers or adjust their charges for existing customers based on their age, pre-existing
conditions, and health habits, insurance premiums may vary with these factors. Also
there is a big price change at age 65, because almost all individuals in the US can en-
roll in Medicare either free or at a low cost when they turn age 65 (a further discussion
is given in section 1.5.2). That is, the insurance price can be expressed as
(1.8) PIt = PIt(D
65
t ,Ext,Bt−1, Ht, τ) + ν˜t,
where D65t is an age dummy indicating age 65 or above; Ext represents other variables
except for Bt−1, Ht, and individual taste τ ; ν˜t is the reduced-form error that may
capture, for example, unobserved supply side factors. By substituting equation (1.8)
for the insurance price in (1.7), equation (1.7) can be rewritten as
(1.9) It = 1
[
fI(Bt−1, Ht, τ , νt)− PIt(D65t ,Ext,Bt−1, Ht, τ)− ν˜t > 0
]
.
In addition, solving the structural equations (1.5) and (1.6) for Bt and Mt yields
semi-reduced form equations for these choice variables. These equations are semi-
reduced forms because they depend on the endogenously determined insurance deci-
sion It except for other exogenous and predetermined variables.
1.3.2 An Illustration with the Quadratic Utility Function
To illustrate, consider a linear health production function, H˜(Mt,Bt, st) = h1Mt+
h′2Bt+h3st, and a quadratic form of the nonlinear term in the utility function, U(Bt−1,
Bt, Ht, τ , νt, st) = Z
′
tΠZt, where Zt = (B
′
t−1,B′t, Ht, τ , νt, st)
′,Π = {uj,k}, j, k = 1,
2, . . . , 6, is the coeﬃcient(Hessian) matrix. The elements in the coeﬃcient matrix are
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conformably deﬁned; i.e., uj,k is a p× q matrix, where p (q) is 3 when j (k) = 1 or 2,
and 1 otherwise.
For simplicity, further assume that st depends on Ht and Bt linearly; i.e., the
initial health status Ht and health behaviors Bt can shift the distribution of health
shock st. It can be shown that the semi-reduced form equations for Bt and Mt then
have linear representations; i.e.,
(1.10) Bt = b0 + b1It + b2Bt−1 + b3Ht + b4τ + b5νt + b6et,
(1.11) Mt = m0 +m1It +m
′
2Bt−1 +m3Ht +m4τ +m5νt +m6et,
where the coeﬃcient b2 is a 3× 3 matrix; all the other coeﬃcients in equation (1.10)
and m2 are 3 × 1 vectors, and the rest are scalars. b1 and m1 in equations (1.10)
and (1.11) represent the average eﬀects of health insurance on health behaviors and
medical utilization.
Given the functional form assumptions and each possible realization of the shocks,
the continuous choice variables in the two periods can all be expressed as linear
functions of It, Bt−1, Ht, τ , νt and shocks. It follows that the diﬀerence between
the expected utility with insurance and without insurance is a linear function of
Bt−1, Ht, τ , νt and PIt. That is, the insurance model can be written as
(1.12) It = 1 [(α1 +α
′
2Bt−1 + α3Ht + α4τ + α5νt)− PIt > 0] ,
where 1[·] is an indicator function as deﬁned before. α2 is a 3 × 1 vector, and all
the other coeﬃcients are scalar. As in equation (1.9), PIt is a function of Bt−1,
Ht, τ , the age dummy D
65
t , and other possible exclusion restrictions Ext, while the
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willingness-to-pay for insurance P ∗It is now given by the bracketed term in equation
(1.12).
Derivation of equations (1.10), (1.11), and (1.12) is provided in the Appendix. The
empirical analysis later is based on these semi-reduced form equations.
1.3.3 The Direct and Indirect Eﬀects of Health Insurance
The semi-reduced form equations (1.10), (1.11), and (1.12) will be numerically
much simpler to estimate than the underlying structural model. The structural pa-
rameters of primary interest, the direct and indirect insurance eﬀects, can be recovered
from the semi-reduced form equations, because of identiﬁcation of the structural Mt
equation and the exclusion restrictions. The following shows the details.
By equation (1.5), we have the structural Mt equation,
(1.13) Mt = fM(It,Bt, Ht, τ , νt, et).
Further, the semi-reduced form equations for Bt and Mt can be written as
(1.14) Blt = gBl(Bt−1, Ht, It, τ , νt, et), for l = 1, 2, 3,
(1.15) Mt = gM(Bt−1, Ht, It, τ , νt, et) ,
which are obtained by solving equations (1.5) and (1.6) for Bt and Mt. For quadratic
utility these would be equations (1.10) and (1.11) in the previous section.
Equations (1.13), (1.14), and (1.15) together imply the following decomposition10
(1.16)
dMt
dIt
=
∂Mt
∂It
+
∂B′t
∂It
∂Mt
∂Bt
.
10For convenience of notation, expressions in this section ignore the fact that It is discrete. For example,
∂Mt
∂It
≡
(Mt|It = 1)− (Mt|It = 0).
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Equation (1.16) means that the total eﬀect of health insurance on medical care uti-
lization, dMt
dIt
, can be decomposed into a direct eﬀect, ∂Mt
∂It
, and an indirect eﬀect
through its eﬀect on health behaviors, ∂B
′
t
∂It
∂Mt
∂Bt
. dMt
dIt
is obtained from (1.15), which
corresponds to the coeﬃcient of It in equation (1.11) when utility is quadratic. The
direct price eﬀect ∂Mt
∂It
is not estimated directly, but can be recovered from equation
(1.16). ∂B
′
t
∂It
represents the eﬀect of health insurance on health behaviors. It is a 1×3
vector of elements given by (1.14). When utility is quadratic, these elements are the
coeﬃcients of It in equation (1.10).
∂Mt
∂Bt
is a 3×1 vector describing the eﬀects of each
health-related behavior on the use of medical care. It involves structural parameters
to be calculated.
Further, equations (1.13) and (1.14) indicate that
(1.17)
∂Mt
∂Bt−1
=
∂B′t
∂Bt−1
∂Mt
∂Bt
,
where ∂Mt
∂Bt−1
is a 3×1 vector of derivatives of the semi-reduced form Mt equation, and
∂B′t
∂Bt−1
is a 3 × 3 matrix of derivatives of the semi-reduced form Bt equations. With
quadratic utility, these are the coeﬃcients of Bt−1 in semi-reduced form equations
(1.11) and (1.10), respectively. Notice (1.17) represents a system of linear equations
in three unknowns, ∂Mt
∂B1t
, ∂Mt
∂B2t
, and ∂Mt
∂B3t
. Solving this system yields
(1.18)
∂Mt
∂Bt
=
(
∂B′t
∂Bt−1
)−1
∂Mt
∂Bt−1
.
Equation (1.18) provides a way to compute ∂Mt
∂Bt
based on the parameters in the
semi-reduced form Bt and Mt equations. Since
dMt
dIt
, ∂B
′
t
∂It
, and ∂Mt
∂Bt
can all be obtained
either directly or indirectly from the semi-reduced form Mt and Bt equations, the
direct price eﬀect ∂Mt
∂It
can be computed based on equation (1.16).
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1.4 Data Features and Empirical Speciﬁcation
Before empirically examining the eﬀect of health insurance on health-related be-
haviors and medical utilization, one needs to consider the complications of using data
on medical utilization and unhealthy behaviors, such as cigarette smoking and alco-
hol drinking. These data are typically characterized by a nontrivial fraction of zero
outcomes and a skewed distribution of the positive outcomes (Manning and Mullahy,
2001). The following addresses these issues separately.
1.4.1 A Large Proportion of Zero Observations
Zero outcomes may indicate non-participation. Participation decisions are gener-
ally considered diﬀerent from consumption decisions and hence modeled separately
in the literature. For example, Yen and Jones (1996) model the quitting decision of
smokers based on the ﬁxed costs and the expected beneﬁts of quitting, where the
beneﬁts depend on how many cigarettes an individual would have smoked had he not
quit (the consumption decision).
The previous section considers consumption decisions. Those equations could be
estimated using participants’ data; however, one needs to deal with the sample se-
lection issue that results from choosing a nonrandom sample of the population, such
as drinkers and smokers. Therefore, this paper adopts a binary choice equation de-
termining the probability of participation (non-zero consumption) and a regression
equation determining the level of consumption, given participation. The participa-
tion equation could be established in theory by following Yen and Jones (1996). Both
the participation and consumption equations include health insurance as a dummy
endogenous regressor. That is, this paper adopts sample selection models or gener-
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alized Tobit models. The generalized Tobit model has been used in Kenkel (1990)
to estimate the eﬀect of consumer health information on health care use. Having
separate participation and consumption equations allows us to distinguish between
the extensive and intensive margins of the health insurance eﬀect.
Besides generalized Tobit, a variety of other models have been applied in the
literature to separate participation and consumption. These include two-part mod-
els, standard Tobit, and variants of generalized Tobit models. For example, Fry and
Pashardes (1994) use Logit instead of Probit for participation and then a linear regres-
sion for positive expenditures to estimate UK household tobacco demand. Examples
of two-part models include Lewit et al. (1981), Wasserman et al. (1991), and Blay-
lock and Blisard (1992). Two-part models assume independence between errors in the
participation and consumption equations, which is not intuitively appealing, because
the utility of participation should depend on the utility derived from consumption.
Standard Tobit models have been used in William (2002) for alcohol consumption
and in Kenkel (1991) for health behaviors including drinking, smoking and exercise.
They rely on the restrictive assumption that zero outcomes and non-zero outcomes
are generated by the same underlying process. Moreover, in the case of multiple
non-negative choice variables, utility maximization does not yield standard Tobit
models.11 Therefore, the standard Tobit is not used here.
1.4.2 A Skewed Distribution of Positive Observations
Implementing Tobit type models requires a normality assumption; however, as
mentioned, data on cigarette and alcohol consumption as well as medical utiliza-
11It can be shown that such maximization yields a system of simultaneous Tobit models, to which the solutions
for nonnegative choice variable do not have a Tobit speciﬁcation. Intuitively, when there are multiple nonnegative
constraints, the optimal value of any choice variable falling on the corner will aﬀect the optimal value of the other
choice variables.
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tion have skewed distributions. Therefore, this paper applies transformations on
the dependent and lagged dependent variables. One transformation is the Box-Cox
transformation, which has been used by Yen and Jones (1996) to model cigarette
consumption in the UK.
Another transformation is the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation (John-
son, 1949). The IHS transformation has been proposed to accommodate non-normal
errors in both regression models and limited dependent variable models (Burbidgebet
al. 1988; MacKinnon and Magee 1990; Horowitz and Neumann 1989). Unlike the
Box-Cox transformation, which can not be applied to random variables that can take
on zero values, the IHS transformation can be performed on random variables that can
take on any value. Yen and Jensen (1995) use this transformation to model household
alcohol expenditures in the US. Their results support using the IHS transformation
in modeling alcohol consumption.
The IHS transformation of a random variable y is
(1.19) T (y, θ) = sinh−1(θy)
/
θ = log
[
θy + (θ2y2 + 1)1/2
]/
θ,
where θ is a nonnegative scaling parameter that can be estimated along with the
other parameters in a model. T (y, θ) is linear around the origin and approximates the
logarithm in its right tail. The parameter θ governs the proportion of the function’s
domain that approximates linear and the proportion that is close to logarithm. In
particular, T (y, θ) goes to y when θ approaches to 0.
Also applied is the logarithmic transformation, which is a limiting case of the Box-
Cox transformation. Results from all three transformations are compared to check
their robustness to diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Since zero outcomes may convey diﬀerent
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information from positive outcomes, a dummy variable indicating last period zero
consumption is included as a covariate. Transformations are then applied to the
positive values of lagged dependent variables. This allows for a more ﬂexible elasticity
proﬁle of lagged health behaviors.
With the appropriate transformation, a two-step approach is used to estimate
the generalized Tobit model. As insurance status is endogenous, the participation
probability equation is jointly estimated along with the insurance equation in the
ﬁrst step; i.e., a Bivariate Probit is estimated. Then in the second step, a bias
correction term (λ) that mimics the inverse Mill’s ratio is added to the consumption
regression equation.12 The same set of covariates are used in the probability and
level equations; therefore, this paper estimates sample selection models, instead of
self-selection models, as distinguished by Maddala (1985).
The full speciﬁcation of the generalized Tobit or sample selection model with trans-
formations can be expressed as
(1.20) It = 1 [X
′
tα− PIt + ωt > 0] ,
(1.21) 1 [Yt > 0] = 1 [X
′
tγ0 + Itγ1 + ς t > 0] ,
(1.22) T (Yt, θY ) = 1 [Yt > 0] · (X′tR0 + ItR1 + πt),
where Xt = (1, T (B
1
t−1, θB), Ht, τ)
′; Y = M or B; T (·) represents one of the three
transformations; θB and θM are the transformation parameters for alcohol consump-
tion and medical utilization, respectively; ωt, ς t , and πt are the error terms.
12The same transformation parameter is involved in both the participation equation and the consumption equation,
so this paper uses an iterative approach to obtain a consistent estimate of the transformation parameter in the two
equations.
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1.4.3 Other Data Issues
Given the fact that the dependent variables are the number of drinks and number
of visits, count variable models, such as poisson or negative binomial models could
be used. However, most count models have restrictive properties. For example, the
Poisson model requires that the conditional variance equals the conditional mean,
while real-life data frequently display overdispersion, i.e., the variance exceeds the
mean. Moreover, both the Poisson model and the negative binomial regression model
can not deal with excess zeros. Recently developed zero-inﬂated count models are
essentially count data versions of selection or Tobit models. In particular, they also
assume there are two separate data generation processes, with one generating only
zero counts, and the other generating counts from either a Poisson or a negative
binomial model.
This study adopts relatively ﬂexible speciﬁcations and estimates appropriate trans-
formations along with the other parameters in the model. Ophem (2000) shows that
count data distributions and continuous data distributions can be related through
transformation. In particular, the simple log transformation, a special case of the
more general Box-Cox transformation, implies an exponential speciﬁcation, which
is related to the Poisson regression in a count data setting. The transformed To-
bit model adopted here facilitates dealing with the endogeneity issues and the two
margins of the eﬀects of health insurance.
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1.5 Sample Description and Model Identiﬁcation
1.5.1 Sample Description
This study uses the 3rd, 4th and 5th waves of HRS data.13 The HRS is a national
panel survey of individuals over age 50 and their spouses in the US. It has extensive
information on demographics, income, family structure, health, health care utiliza-
tion, and insurance etc. Data have been collected every two years since 1992. Seven
waves of data have been made available so far. The ﬁrst two waves have only yes
or no information on individuals’ drinking behavior, while individuals in the last two
waves are on average over 70, and are not suitable for this paper’s empirical analysis.
Individuals older than 70 are removed from the sample. With no uninsured coun-
terparts, these individuals’ extremely high usage of medical care or low unhealthy
behaviors may exaggerate the estimated insurance eﬀects. for example, end-stage
patients may use enormous amounts of medical care, which may not depend on their
insurance status. Including these individuals would lead to upward bias in the esti-
mated eﬀects of insurance on medical use. For the same reason, those who receive
social security disability insurance and those deceased within two years of being sur-
veyed are also excluded. This yields a sample of size 14,289, including 13,016 insured
individuals and 1,273 uninsured individuals.
Drinking behavior is measured by the number of alcoholic drinks consumed per
week and medical utilization is the total number of doctor and hospital visits in a
year. Limited information is available for smoking and exercise, so two dummies
are used to indicate whether or not an individual smokes or participates in vigorous
13This refers to the RAND HRS, which is a contribution of the RAND Center for the Study of Aging. It contains
cleaned and processed variables that are comparable across survey waves. Details can be found in the RAND HRS
data documentation, version F.
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physical activity three times or more per week.14 The full generalized Tobit models
with transformation are then estimated for drinking and medical utilization, while
Probit models are estimated for smoking and exercise.
This paper uses two sets of measures for individuals’ health conditions: self-
reported health status and physician diagnosed diseases, which include hypertension,
diabetes, heart disease, cancer, stroke, lung disease, arthritis, and psychiatric disease.
Self-reported health status was collected in ﬁve categories, but is summarized here
by three dummy variables, deﬁned by excellent health, very good or good health, and
fair or poor health (the default). Note that the health status in the model refers to
that at the beginning of a period of interest, so the previous wave’s health measures
are used.
Unless long enough panel data are available, it is impossible to distinguish between
individual heterogeneity and state dependence, i.e., Bt depends on Bt−1 (Heckman,
1981); therefore, individual heterogeneity τ is parameterized as a function of individ-
ual characteristics, including age, gender, race, education, and income.15 Education
is deﬁned as one of three categories: college or above, high school or GED, and less
than high school education (the default). The average of the respondent’s and the
spouse’s current income is used as the income measure.16 In addition, the number
of children in the household is included to adjust for the actual ﬁnancial status of
the household. Summary statistics of the sample by insurance status are reported in
14The HRS measure of physical activity captures both going to the gym and physically demanding work. That is,
it is a measure of overall physical activity level, so the estimated insurance eﬀect on exercise is essentially that on a
non-sedentary life style.
15Since both the permanent taste τ and taste shifter νt are included in the utility function, any time varying
characteristics such as age, income can be interpreted as observable parts of νt.
16To the extent that current income may be endogenous due to its dependence on current health, one may just
replace current income with lagged ones. However, current income is more relevant to current purchase decisions, and
the impact of this endogeneity if any should be small because health aﬀect income mostly with lags and the model is
conditioning on initial health status.
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Table 1.
Table 1 to be placed here.
As shown by Table 1, the insured individuals are more likely to visit a doctor or
hospital, and they also have more visits on average than the uninsured. Speciﬁcally,
94.1% of insured individuals visited a doctor or hospital at least once in the past two
years, compared with 81.1% of the uninsured.17 The average number of visits per year
among the insured is about 4.4, which is about 1.3 more than that of the uninsured. In
addition, the insured in general have healthier behaviors than the uninsured: 18.4% of
insured individuals smoke currently, in contrast to a much higher rate of 27.4% among
the uninsured. 35.3% of insured individuals currently drink alcohol, which is about
6% higher than that of the uninsured; however, the uninsured drinkers on average
drink 3 more alcoholic beverages per week than the insured drinkers. Therefore,
the insured group consists of a larger fraction of drinkers, whereas they are mainly
light drinkers. Finally, the proportion of individuals who exercise regularly is slightly
higher among the insured than among the uninsured.
It seems that health insurance is associated with healthier behaviors. However,
these simple correlations may reﬂect the selection rather than the causal eﬀect of
health insurance. First, similar diﬀerences exist in past behaviors between the in-
sured and uninsured; i.e., the insured individuals may have a healthier lifestyle ex
ante. Second, the insured are on average about 2 years older than the uninsured.
Age diﬀerence may partly explain their diﬀerence in drinking and smoking, because
these behaviors tend to decline with age among the elderly (Card et al. 2004). More-
17In HRS, individuals are asked to report their health care utilization for the past two years. This paper uses the
average number of physician and hospital visits in one year by dividing the reported number by two.
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over, although the insured tend to report better health for the last period than the
uninsured, overall, they are more likely to have diagnosed diseases associated with
aging, such as hypertension, cancer, heart disease, lung disease, and arthritis. There-
fore, the insured individuals’ physical condition may limit their drinking and smoking.
Finally, the insured on average have higher education and higher household income,
which may indicate better health knowledge and higher health demand, and so may
also account for their healthier behaviors.
1.5.2 Exclusion Restrictions and Identiﬁcation
Insurance status is endogenous in the behavior and medical utilization equations,
so exogenous variation in insurance status is required to avoid identifying these equa-
tions purely through functional forms and distributional assumptions. The theoretical
model in section 4 shows that the variables that determine insurance prices but not
health behaviors and medical utilization can serve as exclusion restrictions, and that
one such variable is the age dummy indicating age 65 or above. Here I introduce
another potential exclusion restriction, self-employment status. Both are discussed
in detail below.
The exogenous change in insurance price at age 65 generates a signiﬁcant jump
in health insurance coverage.18 Card et al. (2004) use this exogenous variation in a
regression discontinuity estimation. The assumption is that medical care utilization
and health behaviors would evolve smoothly with age in the absence of the discrete
18Medicare is available to individuals who are at least 65 years old and who worked at least 40 quarters in covered
employment (or have a spouse who qualiﬁes for coverage). For those who meet the eligibility criteria, Medicare
hospital insurance (Part A) is available free of charge and Medicare Part B (Medicare insurance) is available for a
modest monthly premium. Normally, individuals who are approaching their 65th birthday receive notice of impending
eligibility and are informed that they have to enroll in the program and choose whether or not to accept Medicare
Part B coverage. Medicare is also available to people under 65 who are receiving Disability Insurance, and those with
kidney disease. Individuals who do not qualify on the basis of their own or their spouse’s work history may still enroll
in Medicare at age 65 by paying monthly premiums for both Part A and Part B coverage. This option is limited to
US citizens and legal aliens with at least ﬁve years of residency in the U.S (Card et al., 2004).
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change in insurance coverage at age 65. Card et al. (2004) rules out discontinu-
ities in potential confounding factors such as employment status, income, and family
structure by examining the empirical age proﬁle of these variables.19
In this paper’s sample, the insurance coverage rate for individuals aged 65 or
above is 99.1%, in contrast to 88.1% for individuals under 65, so the age cutoﬀ
for Medicare eligibility has a big impact on the insurance holding probability. The
insurance equation therefore includes the age dummy as a covariate, which is excluded
from the other equations. Age, age squared, and an interaction term between age
and the age dummy are included in all equations to capture the age proﬁle of the
dependent variables. The interaction term allows the ﬁrst derivative of the dependent
variables with respect to age to change at 65, but still maintains that there is no jump
at this age point. Tentatively including the age dummy in the behavior and care
utilization equations did not yield signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. Therefore, similar to Card
et al. (2004), the age dummy is plausibly excluded from these quantity equations.
In addition, self-employed individuals have to pay the full insurance cost, so other
things equal they are much less likely to buy insurance. In our sample, 78.7% of
self-employed individuals have insurance, in contrast to 92.6% of those who are not
self-employed. Since self-employment status aﬀects the probability of having insur-
ance through its impact on the insurance cost, it also serves as a potential exclusion
restriction. Self-employment status is used as an instrumental variable in estimating
the insurance eﬀect on the use of medical care by Meer and Rosen (2003). The va-
lidity of this instrument is checked by analyzing panel data on the transition from
wage-earning into self-employment and showing that individuals who become self-
19A detailed discussion about the validity of this assumption can be found in Card et al. (2004).
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employed do not diﬀer systematically from those who remain wage-earners in the use
of health care. Deb and Trivedi (2006) use a set of employment characteristics, in-
cluding self-employment status, as instruments to identify the eﬀect of the insurance
plan on medical care utilization.
To check the validity of self-employment as an instrument in the current context,
this paper employs samples of individuals whose self-employment status changes be-
tween two waves of data and examines if the transition into or out of self-employment
substantially changes individuals’ health behaviors. Considering there is a two years’
diﬀerence between two waves of data, the validity check is done using the diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence approach, i.e., comparing the probabilities and levels of unhealthy behav-
iors between those who transit into self-employment and those who do not. Similarly,
those probabilities and levels are also compared between individuals who transit out of
self-employment and those who keep being self-employed. None of the diﬀerences are
statistically signiﬁcant. These test results are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix.
Further, several over-identiﬁcation tests show that the exogeneity of the instrumental
variables in the quantity equations of drinking and health care utilization can not be
rejected.20 They provide evidence that these instrumental variables may be valid in
the current setting.
1.6 Empirical Results
This section ﬁrst reports the basic estimation results, and then based on these
results conducts a further investigation on heavy drinking. Finally, it discusses in-
20The validity of the exclusion restrictions is examined using Sargan’s and Basmann’s over-identiﬁcation tests in the
linear instrumental variable regression setting and Hansen’s J test in a two-step eﬃcient general method of moments
(GMM) setting. For the alcohol consumption, the P-values of the three tests are 0.596, 0.597 and 0.622 respectively.
For the medical care utilization, the P-values are 0.192, 0.193, and 0.182, respectively.
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creases in health care utilization caused by the moral hazard eﬀect associated with
drinking.
1.6.1 Basic Estimation Results
Table 2 presents the estimation results for the health insurance decision. Not
surprisingly, these estimates show a signiﬁcant increase in the probability of holding
health insurance at the age of 65.21 Self-employment status is negatively correlated
with having insurance. Smoking last period and higher drinking in the last period are
associated with smaller probabilities of holding insurance, which reﬂect the selection
eﬀect of health insurance. That is, health insurance picks out a sample of individuals
who have healthier behaviors per se.
Having a diagnosed disease in the previous period generally increases the prob-
ability of buying insurance, except for having stroke or psychiatric disease. These
increases are signiﬁcant for heart disease and lung disease. Individuals who self re-
port having good or very good health are more likely to have insurance ceteris paribus
than those reporting either excellent health or poor or fair health. These results may
be due to two counteracting factors: the demand side’s adverse selection and the
supply side’s screening. On the one hand, individuals who are in excellent health are
less willing to buy insurance; on the other hand, individuals who are in poor health
may have diﬃculty obtaining or aﬀording health insurance. As expected, education
and household income have positive eﬀects on the probabilities of having insurance,
while number of children has a negative eﬀect.
Table 2 to be placed here.
21Note that the eﬀect of age 65 or over in the insurance decision is given by the coeﬃcient of the age dummy and
that of the interacted term between age and the age dummy.
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Tables 3a and 3b summarize the estimated insurance eﬀects at the extensive margin
and the intensive margin, respectively. Since reduced-form equations are estimated,
these are the total eﬀects of health insurance. In the probability equations, transfor-
mations are simply applied to the lagged dependent variables, which are less crucial,
so Table 3a only reports the results with the log transformation. Table 3b reports
the insurance eﬀects on the quantities of alcohol drinking and health care utilization
with all transformations. Full estimation results for the quantity equations are in-
cluded in the Appendix (Tables A2 and A3). Also reported in Table 3b are results
from two-part models. As shown by the two tables, health insurance increases both
the probability of visiting a doctor or hospital and the number of visits conditional
on visiting. The increase in the probability is only 0.8% and is not signiﬁcant. In
contrast, the increase in the yearly number of visits among those who do visit doctors
or hospitals is 36.7%. After correcting for sample selection, this is reduced to 34.7%,
which is equivalent to about 1.6 more visits per year.
In addition, health insurance decreases the probability of exercising regularly by
4.6% and increases the probability of smoking by 1.7%. Interestingly, it decreases the
probability of drinking by 6.5%. However, the IHS regression shows that insurance
induces those drinkers to drink around 12.2% more alcoholic beverages per week.
Correcting for sample selection, the increase is reduced to 4.3%, which corresponds
to about 0.3 more alcoholic drinks per week.
Tables 3a and 3b to be placed here.
Estimation of the Box-Cox and log models reveals similar eﬀects of health insur-
ance. In fact, the estimates of the transformation parameters indicate consistency of
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the three speciﬁcations: the IHS transformation parameter is far above zero, while
the Box-Cox transformation parameter is close to zero;22 both suggest that the log
model may be a good approximation. These results need to be interpreted with cau-
tion though, since none of the insurance eﬀects on behaviors in these equation are
statistically signiﬁcant.
Further, as can be seen from Table A2 in the Appendix, last period health, in-
cluding both self-reported health condition and diagnosed diseases, are the major
determinants of doctor or hospital visits, which is not surprising. The coeﬃcients of
the bias correction term λ is negative. This is unusual, but could be a small sample
issue. In this paper’s sample, only about 7% of individuals have never seen a doctor or
hospital for the past two years. The binary choice participation equation and hence λ
may be imprecisely estimated. However, because the sample of individuals with zero
visits is small, ignoring this sample selection issue does not change the estimation
results much. For example, the eﬀect of health insurance on the number of visits goes
down from 36.7% to 34.7%, as shown in Table 3b.
Table A3 in the Appendix shows that last period drinking, smoking, and chronic
disease like diabetes, as well as gender and race are the signiﬁcant predictors for cur-
rent alcohol consumption. Moreover, it is well documented that income and alcohol
consumption is positively correlated (Auld, 2005), which is consistent with the ﬁnd-
ings here. The estimated coeﬃcient for the last period not drinking diﬀers in the
IHS alcohol consumption model from the Box-Cox and log models. This is related to
the diﬀerence of the transformations in the neighborhood of origin. As can be seen,
the diﬀerence in this estimated coeﬃcient does not aﬀect the estimates for all the
22The IHS transformation parameters for the alcohol consumption and doctor/hospitcal visits are 4.24 and 9.01,
respectively. In contrast, the corresponding Box-Cox transformation parameters are 0.025 and 0.006.
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other coeﬃcients in the model. Finally, for both tables, ρ is the correlation of the
reduced form errors in the insurance and the outcome equations. The estimates are
negative. The theoretical model does not generate any predictions regarding the sign
or magnitude of ρ.
1.6.2 Further Investigation on Drinking
The previous section shows that insurance increases the probability of participat-
ing in unhealthy behaviors by a positive but insigniﬁcant amount. This is consistent
with ﬁndings elsewhere in the literature. But some other ﬁndings here, while less sta-
tistically signiﬁcant, are more unusual. First, the two margins of the insurance eﬀect
on drinking go in opposite directions; i.e., insurance appears to decrease the proba-
bility of drinking, but it also induces the drinkers to drink more. Second, insurance
aﬀects the probability of drinking and that of smoking in opposite directions.
A possible explanation for these results is that, unlike smoking, low levels of drink-
ing are considered healthy (Dufour, 1996). The diﬀerence between non-smoking and
smoking is similar to that between light drinking (including non-drinking) and heavy
drinking, rather than between not drinking at all and drinking any amount. This
is consistent with what is observed in the data: compared with the uninsured, the
insured have a smaller proportion of smokers, but a larger proportion of drinkers.
However, the insured drinkers tend to be light drinkers. Therefore, cleanly identifying
the disincentive eﬀect of health insurance on healthy behaviors requires distinguishing
between light drinking and heavy drinking. Mixing light drinkers with heavy drinkers
does not identify the moral hazard associated with drinking.
The following analysis distinguishes between heavy drinking (unhealthy drinking)
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and non-heavy drinking. Heavy drinking is deﬁned as weekly alcohol consumption
being above some percentile of the alcohol consumption distribution. Diﬀerent per-
centiles are tried as cut-oﬀs. The results are reported in Table 4. As shown in the
table, focusing on a sample of heavier drinkers increases the estimated insurance ef-
fects. From the sample of drinkers above the 50th percentile or median to the sample
of drinkers above the 90th percentile, the eﬀect of health insurance on the weekly
number of alcoholic drinks goes from about 1.6 to more than 6. All these eﬀects are
statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 4 to be placed here.
1.6.3 TheMagnitudeof the Indirect InsuranceEﬀect
In this section I apply the results in section 4.3 to evaluate the indirect eﬀects
of health insurance on health care utilization. This entire indirect eﬀect cannot be
estimated because of data limitation. In particular, I cannot estimate quantity equa-
tions for smoking and exercise.23 However, as reported in the previous section, health
insurance appears to make people less cautious regarding heavy drinking, so this sec-
tion investigates how much insurance-induced drinking increases doctor or hospital
visits. The following analysis focuses on above-the-median heavy drinkers.
Rewrite equation (1.16) in section 1.3.3 as
(1.23)
dMt
dIt
=
∂Mt
∂It
+
∂Mt
∂B1t
∂B1t
∂It
+
∂Mt
∂B2t
∂B2t
∂It
+
∂Mt
∂B3t
∂B3t
∂It
.
The increased medical utilization caused by insurance-induced drinking is given by
∂Mt
∂B1t
∂B1t
∂It
in equation (1.23), as B1t represents drinking. In addition, the ﬁrst equation
23For Tobit type models, the marginal eﬀect of a covariate needs to take into account its eﬀects in both the
probability equation and the quantity equation. Speciﬁcally, it is the weighted sum of the two eﬀects. The weights
are the conditional mean and the probability of participation, respectively. To get population mean eﬀects, all the
relevant terms in the formula needs to be calculated in this manner.
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in (1.17) is given by
(1.24)
∂Mt
∂B1t−1
=
∂Mt
∂B1t
∂B1t
∂B1t−1
+
∂Mt
∂B2t
∂B2t
∂B1t−1
+
∂Mt
∂B3t
∂B3t
∂B1t−1
.
As indicated by the estimation results, the eﬀect of the last period drinking B1t−1
on the current period drinking B1t is much larger than the eﬀect on current smoking
B2t or exercise B
3
t ; therefore, the last two terms on the right hand side of equation
(1.24) are relatively small and ∂Mt
∂B1t−1
is mostly determined by ∂Mt
∂B1t
∂B1t
∂B1t−1
. Further, the
last two terms are non-negative, because research shows that unhealthy behaviors
are complements (Cameron and Williams, 2001). It follows that ∂Mt
∂B1t
∂B1t
∂B1t−1
≤ ∂Mt
∂B1t−1
.
Simple algebra further gives the result ∂Mt
∂B1t
∂B1t
∂It
≤ ∂Mt
∂B1t−1
(
∂B1t
∂B1t−1
)−1
∂B1t
∂It
; i.e., the in-
crease in medical utilization caused by the insurance-induced drinking is at most
∂Mt
∂B1t−1
(
∂B1t
∂B1t−1
)−1
∂B1t
∂It
.
Using the sample of above-the-median drinkers, it can be shown that health insur-
ance on average increases doctor or hospital visits per year by 27.9%, and that the
increased visits caused by insurance-induced drinking is at most 0.3%.24 Averaging
this over the whole population will further decrease it below 0.3%. Moreover, if the
number of visits caused by insurance-induced changes in smoking and exercise is of
the same size, then the increased number of visits caused by insurance-induced un-
healthy behaviors as summarized by drinking, smoking and insuﬃcient exercise will
be less than 1%. The total eﬀect of health insurance on doctor or hospital visits is
mainly the direct price eﬀect.
24The numbers reported here are estimates from the IHS Tobit model. The results do not vary much in the Log
and Box-Cox models.
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1.7 Conclusions
This paper investigates the direct and indirect eﬀects of health insurance that can
lead to increased use of health care. A two-period dynamic forward-looking model is
constructed to derive the structural causal relationships among the decision to buy
insurance, health behaviors including drinking, smoking, and exercise, and health
care utilization. Semi-reduced form equations are then obtained for health behaviors
and care utilization as functions of the endogenous health insurance. The structural
parameters of interest, the (direct) price and (indirect) behavioral moral hazard eﬀects
of insurance, are recovered from the reduced form parameters.
Using data from the HRS, this study estimates the eﬀects of health insurance
on drinking, smoking, exercising, and doctor or hospital visits. An additional anal-
ysis then distinguishes between light and heavy drinking, focusing on the eﬀect of
insurance on heavy drinking, and then analyzing possible increases in health care
utilization due to the behavioral moral hazard associated with heavy drinking.
The results show that having health insurance encourages individuals’ unhealthy
behaviors, particularly heavy drinking, but the resulting immediate increase in in-
dividuals’ doctor or hospital visits appears to be negligible. Within the total eﬀect
of health insurance on care utilization, the direct price eﬀect is dominant. The em-
pirical results also suggest that insurance eﬀects at the extensive margin tend to be
smaller than that at the intensive margin. For example, the insurance eﬀects on
probabilities of heavy drinking, smoking, exercising, and visiting a doctor or hospital
are small and insigniﬁcant; whereas those on quantities of heavy drinking and visiting
a doctor or hospital are much larger and statistically signiﬁcant. Therefore, access
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to insurance does not appear to induce people to take up drinking, but apparently
encourages those who are already heavy drinkers to drink even more. It is worth
emphasizing that these reported medical use increases due to behavioral changes are
short run eﬀects. The ﬁnding that these eﬀects are small is therefore not surprising.
The resulting long run eﬀects accumulated over time would likely be much larger.
Since health insurance aﬀects the amount of unhealthy behavior individuals engage
in, it would be beneﬁcial to couple health insurance with incentives to counteract
this behavioral moral hazard. Speciﬁcally, the diﬀerence between the two margins
suggests that to eﬀectively do so, policies should target current unhealthy behavior
participants, such as heavy drinkers. In July 2006, three West Virginia counties
adopted a pilot Medicaid program. Members could sign an agreement valid for a
year that required them to engage in positive health behaviors, such as maintaining
healthy weight, exercising, quitting tobacco use. Those who signed and adhered to
the agreement were then rewarded with additional beneﬁts (Tworek and Horn, 2007).
The results here suggest that such a program would be most beneﬁcial if it targets
people who currently actively engage in unhealthy behaviors, because these people’s
behaviors are most aﬀected by health insurance.
Several issues that are not covered here can be topics for future research. For
example, the current evidence on the moral hazard eﬀect is mainly on alcohol con-
sumption. It would be interesting to see if similar eﬀects exist for other behaviors
that aﬀect health. In addition, doctor or hospital visits here include both visits for
curative purposes and those for preventive purposes; it would be useful to investigate
whether health insurance aﬀects the two types of visits diﬀerently. Addressing these
questions would require more detailed information than is available in the current data
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set. Another issue is that since Canada and some European countries have universal
health care coverage, it would be useful to look at cross-country comparisons.
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Table 1 Summary statistics of the sample by insurance status
Insured (n=13,016) Uninsured (n=1,273)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Visiting a doctor/hospital1 .941 .235 .811 .391
# of visits in a year 4.35 7.74 3.02 4.98
Current period behavior:
Drinking .330 .470 .265 .441
Smoking .167 .373 .262 .440
Exercising2 .504 .500 .485 .500
# of alcoholic drinks3 2.35 5.92 2.69 7.88
Last period behavior:
Drinking .353 .478 .295 .456
Smoking .184 .387 .274 .446
Exercising .523 .499 .516 .500
# of alcoholic drinks 2.47 6.04 3.12 9.59
Last period health status:
Fair/ Poor .166 .372 .269 .444
Good/Very good .652 .476 .571 .495
Excellent .182 .386 .159 .366
Diagnosed disease:
Hypertension .367 .482 .342 .475
Diabetes .096 .294 .099 .299
Cancer .065 .246 .048 .214
Heart disease .119 .324 .072 .259
Stroke .022 .147 .024 .152
Lung disease .050 .218 .038 .191
Psychiatric disease .085 .278 .112 .315
Arthritis .440 .496 .420 .494
Age (in year) 61.65 5.19 59.48 4.97
Male .406 .491 .341 .474
Non-white4 .158 .365 .248 .432
Hispanic .067 .251 .235 .424
Education: Less than high-school .192 .394 .437 .496
High-school or GED .386 .487 .311 .463
College or above .422 .494 .252 .434
Income($1000)5 62.80 86.19 36.27 65.93
Number of children 3.45 2.05 4.01 2.54
1. A dummy indicating whether or not an individual visits a doctor or hospital at least once since the last
survey. 2. A dummy indicating whether or not the individual participates in vigorous physical activity
three or more times per week. 3. The average number of alcoholic drinks consumed in a week for the
last three months. 4. This includes black people and a group of individuals categorized as other (races).
5. In 1997 dollars.
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Table 2 The health insurance decision
Health Insurance
Coeﬀ. (SE) Marginal eﬀect (SE)
Age≥65 -6.31 (3.92)∗ -.998 (.019)∗∗∗
Self-employed -.937 (.046)∗∗∗ -.151 (.011)∗∗∗
Last period behavior:
Log # of alcoholic drinks -.130 (.030)∗∗∗ -.012 (.003)∗∗∗
Smoking -.197 (.041)∗∗∗ -.020 (.004)∗∗∗
Exercising -.034 (.035) -.003 (.003)
Last period health status:
Good/Very good .127 (.048)∗∗∗ .012 (.005)∗∗
Excellent .094 (.064) .008 (.005)
Last period diagnosed disease:
Hypertension .040 (.038) .004 (.003)
Diabetes .090 (.060) .008 (.005)
Cancer .053 (.078) .005 (.006)
Heart disease .199 (.063)∗∗∗ .016 (.004)∗∗∗
Stroke -.048 (.114) -.004 (.011)
Lung disease .238 (.088)∗∗∗ .018 (.005)∗∗∗
Psychiatric disease -.029 (.059) -.003 (.005)
Arthritis .027 (.037) .002 (.003)
Male .162 (.039)∗∗∗ .014 (.003)∗∗∗
Non-white -.173 (.044)∗∗∗ -.017 (.005)∗∗∗
Hispanic -.524 (.053)∗∗∗ -.068 (.009)∗∗∗
Age .135 (.046)∗∗∗ .012 (.004)∗∗∗
Age2·10−2 -.123 (.042)∗∗∗ -.011 (.004)∗∗∗
Age·(Age≥65) .116 (.059)∗∗ .010 (.005)∗∗
Education:
High school or GED .297 (.045)∗∗∗ .025 (.004)∗∗∗
College or above .372 (.049)∗∗∗ .032 (.004)∗∗∗
Log income($1000) .282 (.018)∗∗∗ .025 (.002)∗∗∗
Number of children -.024 (.008)∗∗∗ -.002 (.001)∗∗∗
Not drinking last period -.219 (.061)∗∗∗ -.018 (.005)∗∗∗
Constant -5.07 (1.28)∗∗∗
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level; *** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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Table 3a The insurance eﬀects on the probabilities of visiting a doctor/hospital and
participating in health behaviors
Coeﬀ. of Insurance(SE) Marginal Eﬀect(SE)
Visiting a doctor/hospital .037(.146) .008(.006)
Exercising -.115(.102) -.046(.041)
Smoking .166(.192) .017(.014)
Drinking -.187(.145) -.065(.053)
Table 3b The insurance eﬀects on the number of doctor/hospital visits
per year and the number of alcoholic drinks consumed per week
IHS Box-Cox Log
Percent Change Percent Change Percent Change
change (SE) in # change (SE) in # change (SE) in #
Model (1)
# of visits .367(.069)∗∗∗ 1.67 .365(.069)∗∗∗ 1.66 .368(.056)∗∗∗ 1.68
# of alcoholic
drinks
.122(.100) .900 .120(.098) .886 .108(.095) .794
Model (2)
# of visits .347(.069)∗∗∗ 1.58 .359(.068)∗∗∗ 1.63 .348(.057)∗∗∗ 1.58
# of alcoholic
drinks
.043(.097) .318 .041(.095) .302 .029(.093) .214
1. Model (1): Two-part model, without sample selection bias correction; Model (2): Sample selection model, with
sample selection bias correction;
2. * Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level; ***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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1.8 Appendix
I Derivation of the Structural Equations for Mt, Bt and It Given a General
Quasi-linear Utility Function: Eqs. (1.5) - (1.7)
Based on backward induction, solve for the last stage choices ﬁrst: conditioning
on the information set Ft+1 = {Bt, Ht+1, τ , νt+1}, the individual chooses Bt+1 to
maximize his expected utility; i.e.,
(1.25)
max
{Bt+1|Ft+1}
Est+1
⎡⎢⎣ U(Bt−1,Bt, Ht, τ , νt, st)+βU(Bt,Bt+1, Ht+1, τ , νt+1, st+1)
+Wt − [PItIt +P′BBt + (1− dIt)Mt + βP′BBt+1]
⎤⎥⎦ .
Let Ut = U(Bt−1 ,Bt ,Ht, τ , νt, st) and Ut+1 = U(Bt, Bt+1, Ht+1, τ , νt+1, st+1).
Under certain regularity conditions so that derivative and integral are exchangeable,
the ﬁrst order condition (FOC) for Bt+1 is given by
(1.26)
∫
st+1
(
∂Ut+1
∂Bt+1
+
∂st+1
∂Bt+1
∂Ut+1
∂st+1
)
dF (st+1|Ht+1,Bt+1) = PB,
where F (·|·) denotes the conditional distribution function. Solving the above FOC
for Bt+1 yields the optimal choice B
∗
t+1 ≡ B∗t+1(Bt, Ht+1, τ , νt+1), where Ht+1 =
δHt + H˜(Mt,Bt, st).
In the ﬁrst period, given his information set Ft = {Bt−1, Ht, It, τ , νt}, the individ-
ual chooses Bt and Mt to maximize his expected utility; i.e.,
(1.27)
max
{Bt|Ft}{Mt|Ft,st}
Est,νt+1,st+1
⎡⎢⎣U(Bt−1,Bt, Ht, τ , νt, st)+βU(Bt,B∗t+1, Ht+1, τ , νt+1, st+1)
+Wt − [PItIt +P′BBt + (1− dIt)Mt + βP′BB∗t+1]
⎤⎥⎦ .
Under the same regularity conditions as mentioned above, the FOC for Mt is given
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by ∫
νt+1
∫
st+1
β
∂Ht+1
∂Mt
{
∂B∗
′
t+1
∂Ht+1
∂Ut+1
∂B∗′t+1
+
∂Ut+1
∂Ht+1
− ∂B
∗′
t+1
∂Ht+1
PB +
∂st+1
∂Ht+1
∂Ut+1
∂st+1
+
∂B∗
′
t+1
∂Ht+1
∂st+1
∂B∗′t+1
∂Ut+1
∂st+1
}
· dF (st+1|Ht+1,B∗t+1)dF (νt+1) = 1− dIt,(1.28)
where st = E(st|Ht,Bt) + et and et is the random component of the health shock st,
as st depends on Ht and Bt , and the FOC’s for Bt are given by∫
st
∫
νt+1
∫
st+1
{
∂Ut
∂Bt
+
∂st
∂Bt
∂Ut
∂st
+ β
∂Ut+1
∂Bt
+ β
∂B∗
′
t+1
∂Bt
(
∂Ut+1
∂B∗t+1
−PB + ∂st+1
∂B∗′t+1
∂Ut+1
∂st+1
)
+β
∂Ht+1
∂Bt
(
∂B∗
′
t+1
∂Ht+1
∂Ut+1
∂B∗t+1
+
∂Ut+1
∂Ht+1
− ∂B
∗′
t+1
∂Ht+1
PB +
∂B∗
′
t+1
∂Ht+1
∂st+1
∂B∗′t+1
∂Ut+1
∂st+1
+
∂st+1
∂Ht+1
∂Ut+1
∂st+1
)}
· dF (st+1|Ht+1,B∗t+1)dF (νt+1)dF (st|Ht,Bt) = PB.(1.29)
where ∂Ut+1
∂B∗t+1
represents ∂Ut+1
∂Bt+1
∣∣∣Bt+1=B∗t+1 and ∂st+1∂B∗t+1 represents ∂st+1∂Bt+1 ∣∣∣Bt+1=B∗t+1 . The
above FOC’s show that the individual chooses Mt andBt so that the marginal utilities
equal the marginal costs. Note that the term in the second parentheses in (1.29)
represents the utility loss due to the health eﬀects of unhealthy behaviors. The
negative health eﬀects can be oﬀset by medical care. Assume that the individual
takes this into account, then the second parenthesized term can be substituted by
(1.28). Equation (1.29) can then be written as∫
st
∫
νt+1
∫
st+1
{
∂Ut
∂Bt
+
∂st
∂Bt
∂Ut
∂st
+ β
∂Ut+1
∂Bt
+ β
∂B∗
′
t+1
∂Bt
(
∂Ut+1
∂B∗t+1
−PB + ∂st+1
∂B∗′t+1
∂Ut+1
∂st+1
)}
·dF (st+1|Ht+1,B∗t+1)dF (νt+1)dF (st|Ht,Bt) = PB −
H˜2(Mt,Bt, st)
H˜1(Mt,Bt, st)
(1− dIt).(1.30)
(1.28) and (1.30) deﬁne how the individual chooses health care utilization and un-
healthy behaviors to maximize his expected utility, so they are the structural equa-
tions for Mt and Bt.
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For both It = 1 and It = 0, substitute into the utility function the optimal choices
in the following two stages in a backward manner. Denote these functions as V1(·) =
V1(Wt−PIt,Bt−1, Ht, τ , νt, st, νt+1, st+1) and V0(·) = V0(Wt,Bt−1, Ht, τ , νt, st, νt+1, st+1),
respectively. The individual buys insurance if and only if he expects V1 is greater than
V0, i.e.,
(1.31) It =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1 iﬀ Est,νt+1,st+1 [V1(·)]− Est,νt+1,st+1 [V0(·)] > 0;
0 otherwise.
Note that in (1.31) Wt will drop oﬀ because the utility function is quasi-linear. The
structural equations (1.28), (1.30), and (1.31) correspond to (1.5) - (1.7)in the text.
II Derivation of the Structural and Semi-reduced Form Bt and Mt Equa-
tions Given the Quadratic Utility in Section 3.2: Eqs.(1.10) and (1.11)
For simplicity, let st = ζ1Ht + ζ
′
2Bt + et. Given the quadratic utility and linear
health production function assumptions in section 4.2, equation (1.26), the FOC for
Bt+1, can be expressed as
(1.32)
u2,1Bt + u2,2B
∗
t+1 + u2,3Ht+1 + u2,4τ + u2,5νt+1 + u2,6(ζ1Ht+1 + ζ
′
2B
∗
t+1)+
ζ2
[
u6,1Bt + u6,2B
∗
t+1 + u6,3Ht+1 + u6,4τ + u6,5νt+1 + u6,6(ζ1Ht+1 + ζ
′
2B
∗
t+1)
]
= PB.
Solving for B∗t+1 yields
(1.33)
B∗t+1 = (u2,2 + u2,6ζ
′
2 + ζ2u6,2 + ζ2u6,6ζ
′
2)
−1 [PB − (u2,1 + ζ2u6,1)Bt
−(u2,3 + u2,6ζ1 + ζ2u6,3 + ζ2u6,6ζ1)Ht+1 − (u2,4 + ζ2u6,4)τ − (u2,5 + ζ2u6,5)νt+1] .
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Equation (1.28), the FOC for Mt, can then be written as
(1.34)
h1c2Mt + c2 (δ + h3ζ1)Ht + c3Bt + c4τ + h3c2et = (βh1)
−1(1− dIt) + c1PB
where
c1 = −(u3,2 + u6,3ζ ′2 + ζ1u6,2 + ζ1u6,6ζ ′2)(u2,2 + u2,6ζ ′2 + ζ2u6,2 + ζ2u6,6ζ ′2)−1,
c2 = c1[u2,3 + u6,3ζ2 + ζ1u2,6 + ζ1u6,6ζ
′
2] + u3,3 + u3,6ζ1 + ζ1(u6,3 + u6,6ζ1),
c3 = (c1u2,1 + u3,1) + (ζ1 + c1ζ2)u6,1 + c2(h
′
2 + h3ζ
′
2),
c4 = (c1u2,4 + u3,4) + (ζ1 + c1ζ2)u6,4.
Equation (1.30), the FOC for Bt, can be written as
(1.35) (u2,1 + ζ2u6,1)Bt−1 + c8Bt + c7h1Mt + [c6 + c7(δ + h3ζ1)]Ht + c9τ
= −(u2,5 + ζ2u6,5)νt + (1 + βc5)PB − h−11 h2(1− dIt),
where
c5 = −(u1,2 + u1,6ζ ′2)(u2,2 + u2,6ζ ′2 + ζ2u6,2 + ζ2u6,6ζ ′2)−1,
c6 = u2,3 + ζ2u6,3 + u2,6ζ1 + ζ2u6,6ζ1,
c7 = β(u1,3 + u1,6ζ1 + c5c6),
c8 = c7(h
′
2 + h3ζ
′
2)− c−15 (u1,2 + u1,6ζ ′2) + βu1,1 + βc5(u2,1 + ζ2u6,1),
c9 = u2,4 + ζ2u6,4 + βu1,4 + βc5(u2,4 + ζ2u6,4).
(1.34) and (1.35) yield the following structural equations for Mt and Bt :
(1.36)
Mt = (h1c2)
−1 [h1c1PB + (βh1)−1(1− dIt)− c3Bt − c2 (δ + h3ζ1)Ht − c4τ − h3c2et] ,
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and
(1.37)
Bt = c
−1
8
⎡⎢⎣ (1 + βc5)PB − h−11 h2(1− dIt)− (u2,1 + ζ2u6,1)Bt−1 − c7h1Mt
−(c6 + c7δ + c7h3ζ1)Ht − c9τ − (u2,5 + ζ2u6,5)νt
⎤⎥⎦ ,
where c1, c2, . . . , c9 are deﬁned as above. Solving the simultaneous equation system
(1.36) and (1.37) for Mt and Bt yields the following semi-reduced form equations:
(1.38) Bt = b0 + b1It + b2Bt−1 + b3Ht + b4τ + b5νt + b6et,
(1.39) Mt = m0 +m1It +m2Bt−1 +m3Ht +m4τ +m5νt +m6et,
where
b0 = (c8 − c7c−12 c3)−1[(1 + βc5 − c7c−12 h1c1)PB − h−11 h2 − c7(βc2h1)−1],
b1 = (c8 − c7c−12 c3)−1dh−11 [h2 + c7(βc2)−1],
b2 = −(c8 − c7c−12 c3)−1(u2,1 + ζ2u6,1),
b3 = −(c8 − c7c−12 c3)−1c6,
b4 = −(c8 − c7c−12 c3)−1(c9 − c7c−12 c4),
b5 = −(c8 − c7c−12 c3)−1(u2,5 + ζ2u6,5),
b6 = c
−1
8 c7h3,
m0 = h
−1
1 (c2 − c3c−18 c7)−1[h−11 (β−1 + c3c−18 h2) + c1PB − c3c−18 (1 + βc5)PB],
m1 = −h−21 (c2 − c3c−18 c7)−1d[β−1 + c3c−18 h2],
m2 = h
−1
1 (c2 − c3c−18 c7)−1c3c−18 (u2,1 + ζ2u6,1),
m3 = h
−1
1 (c2 − c3c−18 c7)−1c3c−18 c6 − h−11 (δ + h3ζ1),
m4 = h
−1
1 (c2 − c3c−18 c7)−1(c3c−18 c9 − c4),
m5 = h
−1
1 (c2 − c3c−18 c7)−1c3c−18 (u2,5 + ζ2u6,5),
m5 = h
−1
1 h3.
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III Derivation of the It Equation Given the Quadratic Utility: Eq.(1.12)
The previous section shows that given the functional form assumptionsBt,Mt,Bt+1,
and hence Ht+1 are all linear functions of Bt−1, Ht, It, τ , νt, as well as st and νt+1.
Denote the functions of those variables in the insured state (It = 1) and the unin-
sured state (It = 0) as B
I
t ,M
I
t ,B
I
t+1, and H
I
t+1, for I = 0, 1. Similarly, denote health
shocks in the two states as sIt and s
I
t+1, as health shocks depend on health behaviors.
It is easy to show that B1t −B0t ,B1t+1 −B0t+1, H1t+1 −H0t+1, M1t −M0t , and E[s1t |Ht,
B1t ]− E[s0t |Ht, B0t ], E[s1t+1|H1t+1, B1t+1]− E[s0t+1|H0t+1, B0t+1] are all constants.
The diﬀerence between the individual’s expected utility when It =1 and when It
=0, Est,νt+1,st+1 [V1(·)]− Est,νt+1,st+1 [V0(·)] , can then be written as
(1.40)
Est,νt+1,st+1
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
U(Bt−1,B1t , Ht, τ , νt, s
1
t )− U(Bt−1,B0t , Ht, τ , νt, s0t )
+β
[
U(B1t ,B
1
t+1, H
1
t+1,τ , νt+1,s
1
t+1)− U(B0t ,B0t+1, H0t+1,τ ,νt+1, s0t+1)
]
−P′B(B1t −B0t )− βP′B(B1t+1−B0t+1)− (M1t −M0t ) + dM1t − PIt
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
Since U(·) is quadratic, it is easy to show that the ﬁrst three terms in the above
expression are linear functions ofBt−1, Ht, τ , and νt. Further, B1t+1−B0t+1, B1t+1−B0t+1,
M1t −M0t are constants, and M1t is linear in Bt−1, Ht, τ , and νt. It follows that (1.40)
is a linear function of Bt−1, Ht, τ , νt and PIt. Therefore, It is given by eq. (1.12)
under the quadratic utility and the linear health production assumptions.
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Table AI-1 The impact of transition out of self-employment
on health behaviors
Treatment 1 Control 1 Diﬀ.-In-Diﬀ. P-value
Change in drinking (level) .271 (.300) -.087 (.197) .358(.359) .319
Change in drinking (prob.) -.028 (.021) -.029 (.014) .001 (.025) .965
Change in smoking (prob.) -.009 (.008) -.014 (.007) .005 (.010) .637
Change in exercising (prob.) -.050 (.033) -.027 (.018) -.023 (.038) .536
Table AI-2 The impact of transition into self-employment on
health behaviors
Treatment 2 Control 2 Diﬀ.-In-Diﬀ. P-value
Change in drinking (level) -.509 (.419) -.207 (.041) -.301 (.421) .476
Change in drinking (prob.) -.022 (.028) -.030 (.004) -.008 (.028) .787
Change in smoking (prob.) -.029 (.015) -.012 (.002) -.017 (.015) .267
Change in exercising (prob.) .029 (.041) -.014 (.005) .043 (.041) .300
1. All the changes refer to those from wave 4 to wave 5; standard errors are in the parentheses;
2. Treatment 1: individuals who transit out of self-employment (n=321); Control 1: individuals who are
self-employed in both waves (n=755); Treatment 2: individuals who transit into self-employment (n=175);
Control 2: individuals who are not self-employed in both waves (n=10,595)
50
Table A2 The number of doctor/hospital visits per year (Sample selection model)
Transformation on dependent& lagged dependent variables
log IHS Box-Cox
Health insurance .348 (.057)∗∗∗ .347 (.069)∗∗∗ .359 (.068)∗∗∗
Last period behavior:
# of alcoholic drinks .012 (.013) .011 (.013) .015 (.017)
Smoking -.001 (.025) .000 (.024) -.009 (.024)
Exercising -.065 (.015)∗∗∗ -.065 (.015)∗∗∗ -.065 (.015)∗∗∗
Last period health status:
Good/Very good -.275 (.025)∗∗∗ -.274 (.024)∗∗∗ -.280 (.024)∗∗∗
Excellent -.457 (.034)∗∗∗ -.456 (.033)∗∗∗ -.467 (.033)∗∗∗
Last period diagnosed disease:
Hypertension .168 (.023)∗∗∗ .167 (.023)∗∗∗ .179 (.023)∗∗∗
Diabetes .331 (.029)∗∗∗ .330 (.029)∗∗∗ .341 (.029)∗∗∗
Cancer .168 (.031)∗∗∗ .167 (.032)∗∗∗ .175 (.032)∗∗∗
Heart disease .197 (.026)∗∗∗ .196 (.026)∗∗∗ .204 (.026)∗∗∗
Stroke .212 (.047)∗∗∗ .211 (.050)∗∗∗ .217 (.050)∗∗∗
Lung disease .251 (.036)∗∗∗ .250 (.036)∗∗∗ .255 (.036)∗∗∗
Psychiatric disease .250 (.030)∗∗∗ .249 (.029)∗∗∗ .259 (.029)∗∗∗
Arthritis .163 (.016)∗∗∗ .163 (.016)∗∗∗ .166 (.016)∗∗∗
Male -.071 (.020)∗∗∗ -.070 (.021)∗∗∗ -.081 (.020)∗∗∗
Non-white .026 (.022) .026 (.021) .029 (.021)
Hispanic -.010 (.033) -.009 (.032) -.012 (.032)
Age .001 (.024) .001 (.024) .016 (.023)
Age2·10−2 -.002 (.022) -.002 (.021) -.014 (.021)
Age·(Age≥65) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000)
Education:
High school or GED .008 (.026) .007 (.025) .015 (.025)
College or above .085 (.031)∗∗∗ .084 (.030)∗∗∗ .096 (.030)∗∗∗
Log income($1000) -.007 (.011) -.007 (.011) .001 (.011)
Number of children -.005 (.004) -.005 (.004) -.004 (.004)
Not drinking last period .032 (.025) .057 (.050) .033 (.025)
Constant .916 (.717) 3.87 (.695) .350 (.686)
Lambda -.814 (.193)∗∗∗ -.818 (.187)∗∗∗ -.679 (.187)∗∗∗
ρ -.058 (.029)∗∗ -.058 (.059) -.063 (.059)
Transformation parameter:
# of visits (θM ) 9.01 (22.2) .006 (.006)
# of alcoholic drinks (θB) 4.24 .025
1. Standard errors are computed using the Delta method; * Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcant at
the 5% level; *** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level;
2. ρ represents the correlation of the unobservables in the health insurance and the outcome equations.
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Table A3 The number of alcoholic drinks per week (Sample selection model)
Transformation on dependent& lagged dependent variables
log IHS Box-Cox
Health insurance .029 (.093) .043 (.097) .041 (.095)
Last period behavior:
# of alcoholic drinks .882 (.039)∗∗∗ .877 (.041)∗∗∗ .881 (.037)∗∗∗
Smoking .201 (.028)∗∗∗ .202 (.027)∗∗∗ .199 (.027)∗∗∗
Exercising .015 (.021) .015 (.022) .014 (.021)
Last period health status:
Good/Very good .008 (.042) .006 (.038) .009 (.038)
Excellent .055 (.050) .054 (.047) .054 (.046)
Last period diagnosed disease:
Hypertension -.007 (.024) -.008 (.023) -.008 (.023)
Diabetes -.147 (.055)∗∗∗ -.145 (.049)∗∗∗ -.144 (.048)∗∗∗
Cancer .027 (.043) .026 (.044) .027 (.043)
Heart disease -.011 (.038) -.007 (.037) -.010 (.036)
Stroke -.086 (.085) -.084 (.083) -.088 (.082)
Lung disease .010 (.059) .009 (.056) .011 (.056)
Psychiatric disease -.035 (.046) -.033 (.046) -.034 (.045)
Arthritis -.015 (.022) -.016 (.022) -.014 (.022)
Male .252 (.028)∗∗∗ .250 (.028)∗∗∗ .249 (.028)∗∗∗
Non-white -.113 (.044)∗∗ -.111 (.039)∗∗ -.112 (.039)∗∗
Hispanic .001 (.060) .002 (.047) .004 (.047)
Age -.068 (.032)∗∗ -.020 (.030) -.028 (.028)
Age2·10−2 .061 (.028)∗∗ .019 (.027) .026 (.026)
Age·(Age≥65) -.002 (.001)∗∗∗ -.001 (.001)∗ -.001 (.001)∗∗
Education:
High school or GED -.031 (.043) -.035 (.038) -.032 (.038)
College or above .078 (.048) .072 (.044) .075 (.044)
log Income($1000) .037 (.016)∗∗ .035 (.015)∗∗ .036 (.015)∗∗
Number of children -.002 (.006) -.001 (.005) -.001 (.005)
Not drinking last period -.917 (.197)∗∗∗ 1.00 (.115)∗∗∗ -.907 (.178)∗∗∗
Constant 1.02 (.917) .001 (.882) -.083 (.817)
Lambda 1.14 (.190)∗∗∗ 1.11 (.174)∗∗∗ 1.12 (.172)∗∗∗
ρ -.110 (.061)∗ -.120 (.090) -.118 (.090)
Transformation parameter:
# of alcoholic drinks (θB) 4.24 (5.85) .025 (.013)
1. Standard errors are computed using the Delta method; * Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcant at
the 5% level; *** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level;
2. ρ represents the correlation of the unobservables in the health insurance and the outcome equations.
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CHAPTER II
Kept Back to Get Ahead? Kindergarten Retention and
Academic Performance
2.1 Introduction
The practice of having low-performing students repeat a grade has been hotly dis-
puted and heavily studied by educators, psychologists, and sociologists. This practice
is usually referred to as grade retention. Most of the existing research shows either
negative or insigniﬁcant eﬀects of grade retention on children’s social-emotional ad-
justment and academic outcomes (Holmes & Matthews, 1984; Holmes, 1989; Jackson,
1975; Hong & Raudenbush, 2005; Meisels & Liaw, 1991; Smith & Shepard, 1987).
Meta-analyses conclude that the cumulative evidence does not support the use of
grade retention as an academic intervention (Jimerson, 2001; Holmes, 1989; Holmes
& Matthews, 1984; Jackson, 1975).
Although existing research does not support the use of grade retention as a way
to remedy children’s poor academic performance, it has been popular for decades in
the US. The popularity of grade retention has even increased due to recent emphases
on educational standards and accountability in schools (McCoy, Reynolds, 1999). By
1998, at least 10 states in the US had developed explicit policies for ending social
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promotion (American Federation of Teachers, 1998).1 Social promotion ended in
Chicago and New York City in 1999, and in numerous other cities including Baltimore
and Philadelphia in the 1990s. In North Carolina, the retention rate in kindergarten
through third grade almost doubled from 1992 to 2002 (Early et al., 2003). The
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) and accompanying grade-level tests for
determining promotion further increased grade retention rates.
Although kindergarten retention is less common than upper grade retention in
practice, it is also hotly debated.2 There has been a similar increasing trend in the
kindergarten retention rate (See the position statement of the US National Associa-
tion for the Education of Young Children, 2000 and Hauser et al., 2006). Arguably,
retention is more likely to have positive eﬀects when applied early because repeating a
year hurts less emotionally and may ultimately be more beneﬁcial for young children
(Shepard, 1989). However, limited existing research on kindergarten retention also
suggests that young children get no academic beneﬁts from repeating the program
(Niklason, 1987, Shepard & Smith, 1986a, 1986b, Mantzicopoulos, 1989, Mantzi-
copoulos & Morrison, 1992, Mantzicopoulos, 1997). Shepard (1989) identiﬁes only
one well-controlled study where an academic advantage was found for kindergarten
retainees at the end of ﬁrst grade, though it is not known whether this advantage was
maintained beyond ﬁrst grade.
The discrepancy between educational practice and research ﬁndings makes it both
1Social promotion is the practice of promoting a student to the next grade despite their poor academic performance
in order to keep them with their peers.
2In the US, kindergarten is a class that is organized to provide educational experiences for children (typically 5 - 6
years old) before they enter ﬁrst grade. About 98% of children attend kindergarten, though kindergarten attendance
is mandatory in some states and optional in others (Kauerz, 2005). Kindergarten is usually physically located within
the same institution as elementary school. However, unlike ﬁrst and higher grades, the purpose of kindergarten is
not primarily education, but to introduce children to a school’s social environment and acclimate them to all of the
activities involved in attending and learning in an institutional setting. As a result, retention in kindergarten is likely
to diﬀer both qualitatively and quantitatively from retention in other grades.
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interesting and of practical importance to study this issue using quality data and
rigorous methods. Comparing directly the academic outcomes of retained children
and their promoted peers does not give the causal eﬀect of retention, because the two
groups of children are not comparable in observed and possibly unobserved charac-
teristics that can aﬀect both their probabilities of being held back as well as academic
performance. Diﬀerences in their academic performance might be attributable to any
of these confounding factors instead of repeating a grade.
The existing literature on grade retention is mostly based on quasi-experimental
designs. Some recent exceptions include Eide and Showalter (2000) and Jacob and
Lefgren (2004). Eide and Showalter (2000) adopt linear instrumental variables (IV)
estimation to examine the eﬀect of grade retention on the probability of dropping out
of high school and on labor market earnings. Their study ﬁnds insigniﬁcant beneﬁcial
eﬀects of grade retention. Jacob and Lefgren (2004) explore a natural experiment, the
implementation of an accountability policy in Chicago Public Schools. They adopt
a regression-discontinuity approach and show that grade retention has a modest but
positive net impact on third-grade students’ achievement scores.
Studies based on quasi-experimental designs feature a direct comparison of the
academic performance or social-emotional adjustment between a retained group and
a designated control group. A control group is usually constructed based on the
similarity of demographic characteristics such as gender, race, age, and sometimes
measures of pre-treatment cognitive levels. A control group may also draw on those
children who were recommended to repeat kindergarten but whose parents chose not
to do so.
As noticed by many researchers, in either case the two groups of children may
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not be comparable. In the former case, systematic diﬀerences may exist in some
unobserved (to researchers) characteristics; in the latter, the sample is self-selected by
parents, so potential diﬀerences may exist in family characteristics (Mantzicopoulos,
1997). A retention decision is usually jointly made by schools and parents; as a result,
child, school, and family characteristics may all aﬀect a child’s probability of being
held back as well as his academic outcomes. Failure to match the retained children
with their promoted peers on any of these observed or unobserved dimensions would
lead to violation of the unconfoundness assumption required for matching (Rubin,
1978; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984) and hence biased estimates.
A second problem with matching is that it cannot control for age eﬀects, because
retained and promoted children cannot be matched on both ages and their grade
levels. When the outcome is measured at the same grade level, the estimated eﬀect
captures the retention eﬀect and the eﬀect of becoming one year older. As a rem-
edy, some studies conduct same-grade comparisons as well as same-age comparisons
(Mantzicopoulos and Morrison, 1992). Same-grade comparisons compare retained
children to promoted children at the same grade level, while the retained children
are one year older than their promoted counterparts. Same-age comparisons compare
retained children to promoted children at the same age, while the promoted children
are one grade ahead of their retained peers.
In addition, these studies commonly use data from local school districts. Sample
sizes are typically small, and school retention policies are entirely ignored. However,
in the US not all schools allow children to be held back in kindergarten. Deﬁne schools
that permit kindergarten retention as “retention schools”, and schools that do not
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as non-retention schools.3 Since we observe children being held back if and only if
they attend retention schools and receive a retention treatment, it is interesting to
examine if children are randomly assigned to the two types of schools. If yes, then
school assignment would form a natural experiment and so we could compare children
across school types to obtain more reliable causal inferences. Otherwise, one has to
take into account the non-random selection into diﬀerent types of schools to estimate
the causal eﬀect of kindergarten retention.
Another important literature that is related to this paper examines eﬀects of school
entry age. Examples of this literature include Elder and Lubotsky (2007), Bedard
and Dhuey (2006), Fredriksson and O¨ckert (2005), and Fertig and Kluve (2005). Here
we instead focus on retention eﬀects.
Drawing on a nationally representative sample of kindergartners from the US, this
paper estimates the causal eﬀect of holding children back in kindergarten on their
academic performance in later grades. The reason to focus on kindergarten retention
is twofold. First, the decision-making of holding children back in kindergarten is
diﬀerent from that in higher grades. Kindergarten retention targets children who are
socially immature or have diﬃculty acquiring basic academic skills (Mantzicopoulos &
Morrison, 1992), while (upper) grade retention is based solely or largely on academic
performance. Second, kindergarten retention is administered early on, i.e., before any
real failure occurs, and so is more likely to have positive eﬀects.
This study adds to the existing literature in a number of ways. (1) It estimates
the causal eﬀect of kindergarten retention on academic performance, using recently
collected nationally representative longitudinal data. (2) It considers potentially non-
3This deﬁnition is based on a school’s kindergarten retention policy, not on its higher grade retention policy, which
may be diﬀerent.
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random selection of children into retention schools, and jointly models the school
choice, retention (treatment) decision, and children’s academic performance in higher
grades. This yields a double-hurdle treatment model, where the retention treatment is
a binary choice with sample selection. (3) A control function estimator is derived and
used to estimate the resulting model, which accounts for unobserved heterogeneity in
the retention eﬀect. (4) A nearest neighbor matching is also applied with diﬀerent
assumptions regarding selection of kindergarten retention policies.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the data and vari-
ables. Section 3 sets up the econometric model. Section 4 develops the control func-
tion estimator, discusses instrumental variables, and describes the nearest neighbor
matching estimator. Section 5 reports empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Data
We use data from the US Early Childhood Longitudinal Study — Kindergarten
Cohort 1998-1999 (ECLS-K). It is an ongoing study conducted by the US National
Center for Education Statistics (NCES). They began collecting data on a nationally
representative sample of children in 1998 when these children were kindergartners.4
So far, data have been collected on the full sample in the fall and spring of the
kindergarten year, and the spring of grades 1, 3 and 5.5 Data are gathered from
direct assessments of children and from interviews with parents, teachers, and school
administrators.
The primary advantage of this data set is that it provides test scores that are
4Since the ECLS-K follows a group of kindergarteners, our estimation and conclusion are conditional on attending
kindergarten. Given the fact that only about 2% of children do not attend kindergarten in the US, considering
selection into kindergarten may not substantially change our conclusions.
5This means the time when most students are in their ﬁrst, third, or ﬁfth grade, while some students may be in a
diﬀerent grade due to repeating or skipping a grade. These repeaters or skippers were assessed at the same time as
the majority. No additional assessment was administered when they really were in their ﬁrst, third, or ﬁfth grade.
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intended to reveal children’s true academic levels and are comparable over time. The
ECLS-K gives children two-stage adaptive tests, where a child’s ﬁrst-stage perfor-
mance is used to determine a second test that is suitable for his ability. Test scores
are computed based on the Item Response Theory (IRT), which places children on
a continuous ability scale.6 Compared with the traditional “one-test-ﬁts-all” admin-
istrations, adaptive tests have the advantage of minimizing potential ﬂooring and
ceiling eﬀects and so can reveal children’s true cognitive levels. Moreover, the ECLS-
K puts diﬀerent waves of test scores on the same scale, so they are good for evaluating
academic gains over time. Other beneﬁts of this data set include having information
on school retention policies and kindergarten enrollment age cutoﬀ dates. As shown
later, these variables are important for our modeling and identiﬁcation.
This paper’s analyses focus on children who are either ﬁrst-time kindergarteners
or kindergarten retainees in the 1998 – 1999 school year, and who were assessed in
the spring and fall of kindergarten and the spring of their ﬁrst and third grades.
Removing observations with missing values yields a sample of size 8,672, including
8,391 promoted children and 281 retained children.
The outcome variables are reading and math IRT scale scores in ﬁrst and third
grades. For the retained children, these are test scores in their actual ﬁrst or third
grade, not scores when they would have been in ﬁrst or third grade, had they not
been retained in kindergarten. All the test scores are standardized to have mean zero
and standard deviation one. The explanatory variables include a variety of child,
family, and school characteristics as well as pre-retention (pre-treatment) test scores,
6Since not all students take the same second stage tests, IRT uses the pattern of right, wrong and omitted responses
to the items actually administered in a test and the diﬃculty, discriminating ability, and “guess-ability” of each item
to evaluate a child’s cognitive level.
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i.e., the test scores at the end of the ﬁrst year of kindergarten (K1).7 Pre-treatment
test scores summarize the cognitive or skill accumulation before the retention treat-
ment, including those accumulated before entering kindergarten, which can aﬀect
later school achievement (Elder and Lubotsky, 2007). A full description of these
covariates is provided in the Appendix.
Child characteristics are measured in the base (treatment) year. Family character-
istics, such as SES, may change over time and have missing values for some years. To
save observations, we use the average of non-missing values. In each equation, school
level variables are measured in the same year the dependent variable is measured.
Summary statistics for the key characteristics of retained and promoted children
are listed in Table 2.1. Compared with promoted children, retained children are
signiﬁcantly disadvantaged in almost all the observed aspects. In particular, the
retained tend to have lower than average math and reading test scores before the re-
tention treatment. They are more likely to be boys and on average about 60 months
old at kindergarten entrance, which makes them around 6 months younger than pro-
moted children. Among retained children, 18.5% communicate less well; 5.7% have
diﬃculty hearing speeches; 18.1% are less able in solving problems than their same-
age peers; 17.8% are overactive; 28.5% are disabled, and 12.1% receive individualized
education. These percentages range from two to over ﬁve times those of promoted
children. Further, 11% of retained children’s parents have less than high school edu-
cation, and 24.2% of retained children’s parents do not expect their children to attend
7In the sample, the retained children were assessed when they were already in their second year of kindergarten
(K2). Therefore, for the retained children, we use their test scores at the beginning of K2, rather than the test scores
at the end of K1 as their pre-treatment test scores. Due to the possibility of children attending summer school or
just getting familiar with the test, checking the subsample of children (n=298) who were interviewed both at the
end of K1 and at the beginning of K2 shows that their test scores on average increased over summer. Therefore, the
pre-treatment test scores for the retainees should be lower than their K2 beginning scores, which means the estimated
eﬀect of kindergarten retention should be even larger than what we report.
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college. These numbers are about twice those of promoted children. Finally, retained
children are also more likely to live with a single parent or no parent and be from a
low SES family.
Table 2.1 Summary statistics of children’s key characteristics, by treatment
Retained children
(n=281)
Promoted children
(n=8,391)
Diﬀerence
Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean (Std. Dev.)
K1 math -0.839 (0.873) 0.037 (0.990) -1.194∗∗∗
K1 reading -0.756 (0.923) 0.031 (0.993) -0.983∗∗∗
White 0.655 (0.476) 0.660 (0.474) -0.006
Female 0.324 (0.469) 0.514 (0.500) -0.191∗∗∗
Age-at-entry 60.43 (4.537) 66.69 (4.022) -6.25∗∗∗
Hearing diﬃculty 0.057 (0.232) 0.020 (0.139) 0.037∗∗∗
Seeing diﬃculty 0.068 (0.252) 0.048 (0.214) 0.019
Communication ability: Less well
than same-age children
0.185 (0.389) 0.085 (0.279) 0.100∗∗∗
Overactive 0.178 (0.383) 0.109 (0.312) 0.069∗∗∗
Problem solving ability: Less well
than same-age children
0.181 (0.386) 0.048 (0.214) 0.133∗∗∗
Disabled 0.285 (0.452) 0.126 (0.331) 0.159∗∗∗
Individualized Education Plan (IEP) 0.121 (0.327) 0.023 (0.150) 0.098∗∗∗
Parental educational expectation:
High school or less
0.242 (0.429) 0.129 (0.335) 0.113∗∗∗
SES -0.009 (0.814) 0.129 (0.745) -0.138∗∗∗
Parents’ highest education:
Bachelor’s degree or above
0.327 (0.470) 0.383 (0.486) -0.056
Less than high school 0.110 (0.314) 0.049 (0.216) 0.061∗∗∗
Family type: Single/no parent 0.206 (0.405) 0.159 (0.366) 0.047∗∗∗
Note: ∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
2.3 The Econometric Model
This section sets up an econometric model for the retention treatment and aca-
demic outcomes. We observe a child being held back in kindergarten if and only if the
child attends a retention school and receives the treatment of repeating kindergarten.
As shown by the data, these two decisions are jointly determined; i.e., observed and
possibly unobserved family characteristics may aﬀect both. This section therefore
models the retention treatment as a binary choice (whether to repeat kindergarten)
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with sample selection (selection into a retention school). The outcome equation is
a linear regression where the retention dummy is an endogenous regressor with a
correlated random coeﬃcient, which captures the heterogeneity of treatment eﬀects.
2.3.1 The Retention Model
Among the 726 schools in our sample, there are 616 retention schools and 110 non-
retention schools. Kindergarteners in the two types of schools have diﬀerent risks of
being held back, and the risk in non-retention schools is nearly zero.8 If children are
not randomly assigned to these two types of schools, then appropriate modeling of
the retention treatment needs to take into account this non-random selection.
Let S be a binary variable indicating whether a child attends a retention school.
Let XS be a vector of observables and εS an unobservable that determine a child’s
propensity of attending a retention school. Assume that a child attends a retention
school if and only if X ′Sη + εS ≥ 0, where η is the vector of coeﬃcients. That is,
(2.1) S = I(X ′Sη + εS > 0),
where I(·) is an indicator function that is 1 if the bracketed expression is true, and 0
otherwise.
Let D∗ be the potential kindergarten retention status for a child, regardless of
the type of school he is in. By deﬁnition, D∗is observed only if the child attends
a retention school. Let XDbe a vector of observables and εD an unobservable that
determine a child’s propensity of being held back in kindergarten. Assume that a
child potentially belongs to the retained group if and only if X ′Dδ + εD ≥ 0, where δ
8In practice, children in non-retention school may repeat kindergarten if they change schools. Limited by our data,
we do not consider this case in our analysis, i.e., we assume that children are at-risk only when they attend retention
schools.
67
is the vector of coeﬃcients. That is, we have
(2.2) D∗ = I(X ′Dδ + εD ≥ 0).
Assume that εS and εD may be correlated with each other, but they are independent
ofXs and XD; i.e., Xs and XD are exogenous in equations (2.1) and (2.2).
Further, denote the observed retention status as D. It follows that
(2.3) D = S ·D∗ = S · I(X ′Dδ + εD ≥ 0).
For clarity, we refer to equation (2.1) as the school selection equation, equation (2.2)
as the retention (treatment) equation, and both together along with equation (2.3)
as the retention model.
If εS and εD are uncorrelated; i.e., children are not selected into retention schools
due to their unobserved (to econometricians) characteristics that are correlated with
D∗, kindergarten retention policies then generate exogenous variation in D. Equation
(2.3) could therefore be estimated independently using data from retention school
children. However, if εS and εD are correlated, estimation then needs to account for
this joint determination of school selection and retention decisions. Ignoring non-
random selection into retention schools would lead to biased estimates. Note that
joint estimation of equations (2.1) and (2.3) does not rule out the case of random
school selection. In fact, it nests random school selection as the special case in which
the correlation between εS and εDis zero.
To investigate if joint estimation is necessary, we compare retention school children
with non-retention school children. It appears that children are not randomly selected
into retention schools. For example, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show how the probabilities of
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attending non-retention schools are diﬀerent for children from diﬀerent family back-
grounds. As one can see, children from low SES families, living with single parent
or no parent or with less educated parents are more likely to attend non-retention
schools. We also test the similarity of these family characteristics between retained
and promoted children. The results are reported in Table 3.1, where all the mean
values are percentages except that of SES. Table 3.1 shows that children in retention
schools diﬀer signiﬁcantly from children in non-retention schools in terms of family
characteristics, such as family SES, parents’ education, and single or no parent family
type.
Table 3.1 Summary statistics of family characteristics, by retention policy
Non-retention school
children (n=1,357)
Retention school
children (n=7,315)
Diﬀerence
SES -0.049
(0.764)
0.156
(0.740)
-0.202∗∗∗
Parents’ highest education:
Less than high school
0.069
(0.213)
0.048
(0.253)
0.021∗∗∗
High school or above, but
less than a bachelor degree
0.552
(0.497)
0.650
(0.477)
0.098∗∗∗
Bachelor degree or above 0.282
(0.450)
0.400
(0.490)
-0.118∗∗∗
Family type:
Single/no parent
0.220
(0.414)
0.149
(0.356)
0.071∗∗∗
Note: ∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Given the diﬀerences in these observed family characteristics, it is likely that the
two groups of children also diﬀer in unobserved family characteristics that aﬀect
school selection and retention decisions as well as outcomes. For example, parents’
preferences or willingness to invest in their children’s education aﬀects the children’s
chances of attending retention schools, probabilities of repeating kindergarten, and
their academic performance. In particular, one may expect that parents who are more
involved are more likely to enroll their children in retention schools, and high parental
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Figure 3.1: Percentage of kindergarteners attending non-retention schools, by family SES
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Figure 3.2: Percentage of kindergarteners attending non-retention schools, by family type and parents’
education
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involvement may also reduce these children’s risk of being held back. Therefore,
equations (1) and (3) should be jointly estimated.
2.3.2 The Test Score Equation
If one could observe each child’s test scores when he is retained in kindergarten
and when he is not, then the average treatment eﬀect (ATE) of kindergarten retention
would be simply the mean diﬀerence of test scores for all children in the two states
of the world. In this case the average treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATT), i.e., the
average retention eﬀect of retained children, would be given by the mean diﬀerence
of the retained children’s test scores in the two states of the world. ATT is the eﬀect
of interest in the current context, so we focus on estimating this eﬀect.
Denote a child’s potential test scores with and without being held back as Y1 and
Y0, respectively, regardless of his actual retention status. The ATE is then given by
E(Y1)−E(Y 0), and the ATT is given by E(Y1 |D = 1)−E(Y0 |D = 1). However, for
each child, we can only observe his test score either when he is retained or when he is
not. Given the potential outcomesY1 andY0, the observed test score Y can be written
as DY1 + (1 − D)Y0. Assuming that the conditional expectations of Y1 and Y0 are
given by X ′Y β1 andX
′
Y β0, respectively, where XY is a vector of observed child, family,
and school characteristics, including a constant term, we then have
(2.4) Y1 = X
′
Y β1 + εY 1,
(2.5) Y0 = X
′
Y β0 + εY 0,
where εY 1 and εY 0 are mean zero error terms that are independent ofXY . Further
assume that the returns to observed characteristics are the same in the two states of
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the world; i.e., β1and β0diﬀer only in constant terms. Denoting the diﬀerence as γ,
we can then write9
(2.6) Y = X ′Y β0 + γD +DεY 1 + (1−D)εY 0,
which can be rewritten as
(2.7) Y = X ′Y β0 + (γ + εY 1 − εY 0)D + εY 0.
In the above equation γ represents the ATE, and εY 1−εY 0 represents the heterogeneity
of treatment eﬀects. E(εY 1 − εY 0|D = 1) is non-zero as long as E(εY 1|D = 1) =
E(εY 0|D = 1); i.e., the returns to children’s unobserved characteristics diﬀer in the
two states of the world, so children can be selected into retention due to higher gains
from the treatment. The ATT, γ +E(εY 1− εY 0|D = 1), is diﬀerent from the ATE in
this case.
2.4 The Estimation of ATT
2.4.1 The Control Function Estimator
Given the retention model and the outcome equation developed in the previous
section, the full model can be written as
(2.8) S = I(X ′Sη + εS > 0),
(2.9) D∗ = I(X ′Dδ + εD ≥ 0),
(2.10) D = S ·D∗,
9Note that this assumption is imposed for simplicity. It is not an identiﬁcation assumption. In fact, our estimation
applies to the general model without this assumption.
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(2.11) Y = X ′Y β0 + γD +DεY 1 + (1−D)εY 0,
By this structure, we allow the kindergarten retention policy to have direct and
indirect eﬀects on retention probabilities as well as an indirect (selection) eﬀect on
test scores.
Since common unobservables may aﬀect a child’s school selection, probability of
being held back, and academic performance, the four error terms in the above model
are correlated with each other, which means D is endogenous in equation (2.11).
Therefore, OLS is biased, and linear IV can not consistently estimate equation (2.11)
unless εY 1 = εY 0 is assumed,
10 which would imply absence of heterogeneity in the
treatment eﬀect, and so rule out individuals’ self-selection into the retention treatment
based on higher returns, i.e., higher values of E(εY 1− εY 0|D = 1). Details about this
restrictive assumption and its implications can be found in Heckman (1997). We
focus on the more general case without this restriction and allow the treatment eﬀect
to be heterogeneous across individuals.
The above model can be estimated by a control function (CF) approach. This
involves plugging into the model of interest (the test score equation in our case) one
or more bias correction terms. One way to construct a bias correction term is to
use the conditional mean of the error term, conditional on all the covariates. This
approach has been proposed and applied to the standard treatment model, i.e., a
linear regression with an endogenous dummy regressor that is speciﬁed as a Probit
(Vella and Verbeek, 1999). Here we derive a control function estimator for this paper’s
10When εY 1 = εY 0, under a monotonicity assumption about the instrumental variable, some form of IV estimation
can yield the local average treatment eﬀect (LATE) and the marginal treatment eﬀect (MTE). The former is the
treatment eﬀect on compliers, i.e., those who are retained because of the exogenous variation caused by the instrument,
while the latter is the limit of LATE for an inﬁnitely small change in the value of the instrument. Both diﬀer from
ATT. Discussion about the necessary condition for identifying ATT can be found in Manning (2004) and the references
therein.
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more general model.
Assume that the error terms in equations (2.8) - (2.11) have a joint normal dis-
tribution,11 and denote the covariance for each pair of error terms (εD, εS), (εY 1, εS),
(εY 0, εS), (εY 1, εD), and (εY 0, εD) as σSD, σ1S,σ0Sσ1D, and σ0D, respectively. Given
the vector of all covariates X = (X ′Y , X
′
D, X
′
S)
′, the conditional mean of the structural
error term in equation (2.11) can be written as
(2.12)
E(DεY 1 + (1−D)εY 0|S,D,X)
= SD · E(εY 1 |S = 1, D = 1, X)
+S(1−D) · E(εY 0 |S = 1, D = 0 , X)
+(1− S) · E(εY 0|S = 0, X).
Under the normality assumption, the three conditional expectations on the right-hand
side of equation (2.12) are given by
(2.13)
E(εY 1 |S = 1, D = 1, X)
= E(εY 1 |S = 1, D∗ = 1, X)
= E(εY 1 |εS > −X ′Sη, εD > −X ′D δ,X)
= σ1S−σ1DσSD
1−σ2SD
φ(X′Sη)
Φ(X′Sη)
+ σ1D−σ1SσSD
1−σ2SD
φ(X′Dδ)
Φ(X′Dδ)
,
(2.14)
E(εY 0 |S = 1, D = 0, X)
= E(εY 0 |S = 1, D∗ = 0, X)
= E(εY 0 |εS > −X ′Sη, εD < −X ′D δ,X)
= σ0S−σ0DσSD
1−σ2SD
φ(X′Sη)
Φ(X′Sη)
+ σ0D−σ0SσSD
1−σ2SD
−φ(X′Dδ)
1−Φ(X′Dδ) ,
11Test scores are bounded, so formally the errors in the test score equations cannot be normal. However, the tails
of the test score distributions resemble normal tails, for example, the kurtoses range from 2.7 to 3.1. Also, as will be
discussed later, the CF estimator permits some forms of non-normality in the errors.
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and
(2.15)
E(εY 0 |S = 0, X)
= E(εY 0 |εS < −X ′Sη ,X) = σ0S −φ(X
′
Sη)
1−Φ(X′Sη) ,
where φ(·)and Φ(·)represent the probability and cumulative density functions of the
standard normal distribution, respectively. As usual, we have normalized the variance
of εS and εD to unity.
Denote SD
φ(X′Sη)
Φ(X′Sη)
, SD
φ(X′Dδ)
Φ(X′Dδ)
, S(1−D) φ(X′Sη)
Φ(X′Sη)
,S(1−D) −φ(X′Dδ)
1−Φ(X′Dδ) ,and (1−S)
−φ(X′Sη)
1−Φ(X′Sη)
as λk(k = 1, 2, ..., 5). Plugging these terms into equation (2.11) yields the augmented
equation
(2.16) Y = X ′Y β + γD +
5∑
k=1
ρkλk + e,
where ρk(k = 1, 2, ..., 5)are the coeﬃcients of the bias correction terms, and eis the
error term in the augmented equation. It is easy to show that e is uncorrelated with
the covariates in equation (2.16), so OLS can be used to estimate this equation. That
is, the full model can be estimated by a two-step procedure: First, jointly estimate
equations (2.8) and (2.10) to get ﬁtted values for λk(k = 1, 2, ..., 5), and then plug
these ﬁtted values into equation (2.16) and estimate it by OLS.
In the previous section we show that the ATT is given byγ +E(εY 1− εY 0|D = 1).
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The second term can be rewritten as
E(εY 1 − εY 0|D = 1)
= EX|D=1 [E(εY 1 − εY 0|D = 1, X)]
= EX|D=1 [E(εY 1 − εY 0|S = 1, D∗ = 1, X)]
= EX|D=1 [E(εY 1 − εY 0 |εS > −X ′Sη, εD > −X ′D δ,X)]
= EX|D=1
[(
σ1S−σ1DσSD
1−σ2SD
− σ0S−σ0DσSD
1−σ2SD
)
φ(X′Sη)
Φ(X′Sη)
]
+ EX|D=1
[(
σ1D−σ1SσSD
1−σ2SD
− σ0D−σ0SσSD
1−σ2SD
)
φ(X′Dδ)
Φ(X′Dδ)
]
= EX|D=1 [(ρ1 − ρ3)λ1 + (ρ2 − ρ4)λ2] ,
where EX|D=1[·] = EX [·|D = 1], i.e., the conditional expectation over X, conditional
on D = 1. Since the ﬁrst step gives estimates for λ1 and λ2, and the second step yields
estimates for ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, and ρ4, the above conditional expectation can be estimated
using the empirical expectation of these estimated terms over the retained children.
The estimated ATT is then given by this conditional expectation plus the estimated
γ. As with other two-step estimators, the correct standard error can be obtained by
bootstrapping.
Given our distribution assumption, the full model could also be estimated using
joint maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). The two methods are both consistent,
but the two-step CF estimator is computationally more tractable. Moreover, the CF
estimator remains valid where the joint MLE may not. For example, MLE requires the
distribution of the outcome error to be fully speciﬁed, while the CF estimator permits
the outcome error to equal a speciﬁed error (e.g. normal) plus another independent
error that has an unknown distribution; the normal error may capture the common
unobservables in the model, and the independent error may represent additional pure
noise.
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2.4.2 The Retention Model and Instrumental Variables
Although the CF approach described in the previous section is valid without any
instrumental variables, in general one would like some instruments in the school
selection and retention equations to avoid identiﬁcation purely based on functional
forms. In the current context, a potential instrument for the retention equation is
the kindergarten enrollment age cutoﬀ date, and possible instruments for the school
selection equation are a school’s policy regarding whether children can be retained
multiple times in elementary years and a set of dummies indicating how children
travel to school. Diﬀerent school travel modes include walking or riding a bike (the
default category), riding a bus, being dropped oﬀ by a parent, being dropped oﬀ by a
day care provider, and other means. These instruments are discussed in detail below.
The kindergarten enrollment age cutoﬀ date (the cutoﬀ date hereafter) refers to
the date by which children must reach the age of ﬁve to be eligible for kindergarten
enrollment. Diﬀerent states in the US have diﬀerent cutoﬀ dates. A full list is
presented in the Appendix. These dates vary widely across states. They may also vary
within a state for two reasons: ﬁrst, private and charter schools can have cutoﬀ dates
that diﬀer from the state requirement; second, some states allow the local education
agencies (LEA’s) to set their own cutoﬀ dates. The ECLS-K dataset has information
on cutoﬀ dates at the school level, so we can exploit the exogenous variation in cutoﬀ
dates across schools.
As mentioned, child, family, and school characteristics can all aﬀect a child’s prob-
ability of being held back. Relevant child characteristics include a child’s absolute age
and relative age. Absolute age is a child’s chronological age, and relative age refers
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to a child’s age relative to the ages of his classmates. To a large extent, absolute age
determines a child’s maturity and readiness for learning, and hence also aﬀects his
social-emotional adjustment and academic performance.
Further, it is well documented that relatively young children are more likely to
be held back, ceteris paribus (Mantzicopoulos et al., 1989; Collins & Brick 1993;
McArthur & Bianchi, 1993; Zill, Loomis & West, 1997; McEwan & Shapiro, 2006;
and Elder & Lubotsky, 2007). For a particular child, given his age at kindergarten
entry (age-at-entry), the later the cutoﬀ date is, the younger the reference group
will be, and hence the smaller the child’s risk of being held back. For example,
assuming that birth dates are uniformly distributed over the year, the average age of
kindergarteners in a school with Sept. 1 as the cutoﬀ date will be three months older
than those in a school with Dec. 1 as the cutoﬀ date.12 That is, the cutoﬀ date can
aﬀect a child’s probability of being held back by shifting the age distribution of his
class.
Since relative age is a function of absolute age and the cutoﬀ date, the reduced-
form retention equation should include age-at-entry, the cutoﬀ date and possibly their
higher order and interacted terms as covariates.Whether higher order or interacted
terms need to be included depends on the nonlinearity of the retention probability
in absolute and relative ages. Based on tests and comparisons of alternative spec-
iﬁcations,13 we adopt a retention equation that includes absolute age, absolute age
squared, and the cutoﬀ date as covariates.
12Given the typical school start date, Sept. 1, the average age of kindergarteners in the former case is about 66
months; whereas the average age of kindergarteners in the latter case is about 63 months. The enrollment cutoﬀ date
extracts the exogenous variation in the average age of kindergarten enrollees.
13Our evaluation criteria are the model’s pseudo R2, percentage predicted correctly and the signiﬁcance of coeﬃ-
cients. When we add other higher order and interacted terms, the pseudo R2 and the percentage predicted correctly
do not change much and their coeﬃcients are not statistically signiﬁcant.
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The cutoﬀ date should not have a direct impact on test scores unless the curriculum
taught in the classroom is aﬀected by the age of one’s peers in a particular grade. If
this is true, the cutoﬀ date may aﬀect test scores by changing the age distribution
of the class, and so may not be a valid instrument. To investigate this possibility,
we tentatively include the cutoﬀ date as a regressor in all four test score equations.
None of its coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. This provides evidence that
conditional on the covariates, the cutoﬀ date does not have additional explanatory
power for test scores. Therefore, this variable can be appropriately excluded from
those equations.
For the school selection equation, one of the proposed instruments is a dummy
indicating multiple retention policies in elementary years.14 We expect that schools
that allow multiple retentions in elementary years are more likely to allow kinder-
garten retention, because retention policies more or less reﬂect a school’s educational
philosophy. This is supported by the following fact: Among schools that permit
multiple retentions in elementary years, about 95% allow kindergarten retention, in
contrast to 82.8% among schools that do not.
Further, instrument validity requires that this multiple retention policy dummy
aﬀects the probability of repeating kindergarten only through its eﬀect on school’s
kindergarten retention policies. Our data show that among retention schools, those
permitting multiple retentions in higher grades have a similar retention rate in kinder-
garten to those not permitting. The former cell mean is 3.9%, and the latter is 3.8%.
The diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant at any conventional level. Therefore, con-
ditional on kindergarten retention policy, the policy of multiple retentions in higher
14Information is missing on the multiple retention policy for about 7.5% of the full sample. To save observations,
we use a dummy to indicate missing values instead of dropping them.
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grades does not seem to have a signiﬁcant impact on the probability of repeating
kindergarten, and so we exclude it from the retention equation.
We also check if the multiple retention policy dummy itself has a direct eﬀect on
children’s academic performance. When this variable is included as an additional
covariate in all four test score equations, none of the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at
the 5% level. Therefore, we assume that this multiple retention policy dummy is
exogenous to the test score equation.
Another set of potential instruments for the school selection equation are the school
travel mode dummies. We expect that diﬀerent travel modes are correlated with the
distance from home to school or how convenient it is to get to school, and so they may
aﬀect school choices exogenously. For example, parents that otherwise prefer retention
schools may enroll their children in a non-retention school if it is conveniently located.
Admittedly, both the multiple retention policy and transportation mode instru-
ments may be ﬂawed, but for diﬀerent reasons. Having multiple instruments allows us
to do robustness checks: If either one is not a valid instrument, estimation with either
one or both would not be expected to produce similar results. As will be shown, the
estimation results are robust to the use of diﬀerent instrumental variables.
2.4.3 Nearest Neighbor Matching
To compare with the CF approach, a bias-corrected nearest neighbor matching
(NNM) as proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2002) is performed. Matching meth-
ods assume unconfoundedness; i.e., conditional on observed characteristics, individ-
uals’ potential outcomes are independent of the assignment of treatment. Therefore,
matching estimators only balance observed, but not unobserved diﬀerences between
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treated and control units. Selection on unobservables is likely to be important here,
so unconfoundedness is a potential issue for NNM. Comparing results from the CF
and NNM may shed light on the role of unobservables in selection into diﬀerent types
of schools and the retention treatment.
Further, matching estimators rely on a common support assumption, which re-
quires substantial overlap in the observed covariate distributions of the treated and
control groups. Table 4.1 shows observed ranges and standard deviations of the con-
tinuous covariates for both. The common support assumption appears to hold well for
pretreatment math and reading test scores and family SES, but not for age at kinder-
garten entry. Because age is likely to be an important determinant for academic
performance, this possible violation of the common support assumption is another
potential issue for NNM in this paper’s setting.
Table 4.1 Observed ranges of the continuous covariates, by treatment
Retained children
(n=281)
Promoted children
(n=8,391)
Min. Max. Std. Dev. Min. Max. Std. Dev.
K1 math -2.267 4.323 0.873 -2.255 5.555 0.991
K1 reading -1.965 4.640 0.923 -1.887 6.470 0.993
Age-at-entry 46.27 69.03 4.537 57.03 80.90 4.022
SES -2.800 2.573 0.814 -2.900 2.737 0.745
NNM imputes an individual’s counterfactual outcomes using a weighted average of
outcomes from individuals with similar characteristics (in the nearest neighbor sense)
but opposite treatments. Since each individual can be characterized by a k vector
of covariates, similarity is deﬁned based on a measure of the distance between two
vectors. When the dimension of the covariate vector is high, matching could be very
inexact, and serious biases may result. To reduce such biases, NNM conducts linear
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smoothing.
The ECLS-K data has extensive information at the child, family, and school level,
and so provides a rich set of control variables. If all the assumptions required for
matching hold, NNM would asymptotically eliminate the biases resulting from inexact
matching with a large set of covariates. In our case, retained children are matched
to their promoted peers on the full set of covariates except for the instrumental
variables.15 In addition, although there is no rule of thumb for the optimal number of
control units matched to one treated unit, generally the number should increase with
the sample size. Given the large pool of controls (non-retainees), we set the number
to 15.16
2.5 The Empirical Results
2.5.1 Risk factors for kindergarten retention
The full estimation results for the retention model are reported in Tables A3-
(1) – A3-(3) in the Appendix. These three tables provide estimates with diﬀerent
instrumental variables in the school selection equation, namely, the multiple retention
policy in elementary years, school travel modes, or both.
Typically, in discrete choice models when one of the alternatives is very overrep-
resented, identiﬁcation becomes quite diﬃcult. Given the small proportion of the
retained and the relatively small proportion of non-retention schools, one may worry
about the identiﬁcation of the retention model, especially the retention equation.
However, this equation appears to be well identiﬁed and most of the explanatory
15Age-at-entry is matched on instead of age-at-test., because it is more appropriate to control for children’s pre-
treatment characteristics, while age-at-test is a variable aﬀected by the retention treatment. This is also because
matching on age-at-test would result in a sample of promoted children being about one year older than the retained
children at kindergarten entry. The average age of the retained children in our sample is 60.4 months, which means
the average age for the promoted children would be 72.4.
16We tried diﬀerent numbers between 10 and 20. The results remain stable.
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variables are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. One important source of identiﬁcation
is the big diﬀerence in the distributions (particularly the means) of covariates between
the promoted and retained and between the retention school and non-retention school
children (See Tables 2.1 and 3.1).17
Compared with school travel modes, the multiple retention policy in higher grades
seems to be a stronger instrument. In particular, it yields a higher Pseudo R2 (0.121
vs. 0.043) and generally more signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for the school selection equation.
However, using either instrument or both, the coeﬃcients of the instrumental variables
in the selection equation are statistically signiﬁcant. All the estimated coeﬃcients,
especially those in the retention equation, are similar across speciﬁcations.
For the rest of the discussion, we focus on estimation results when both sets of
instrumental variables are used. As we can see, the signs of all the estimated coef-
ﬁcients are plausible. In particular, the coeﬃcient of the multiple retention policy
dummy is signiﬁcantly positive, which is consistent with our expectation. The co-
eﬃcients of school travel modes are also jointly signiﬁcant with a P -value less than
0.001. The estimated coeﬃcients of all four travel mode dummies are positive; i.e.,
children who walk or ride a bike to school (the default category) are more likely to
attend non-retention schools, which could be choices of convenience. In addition,
younger children, children with seeing diﬃculty, being overactive, or children from
single/no parent families are more likely to attend non-retention schools. Finally,
all-day schools, private schools, or schools receiving federal Title I funds are more
likely to be non-retention schools.
Also as expected, the cutoﬀ date in the retention equation has a signiﬁcantly neg-
17The author would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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ative coeﬃcient; i.e., holding all the other covariates constant, the later the cutoﬀ
date, the smaller the chance of being held back in kindergarten. Negative coeﬃcients
of pretreatment test scores indicate that the lower the test scores in the ﬁrst year
of kindergarten, the higher the probability of being retained. Low math scores are
more strongly correlated with repeating kindergarten than low reading scores. Some
other child level risk factors, such as being young when entering kindergarten, being
disabled, having lower problem solving ability than same-age children, receiving in-
dividualized education,18 and low parental educational expectation can also increase
children’s probability of being held back. However, hearing diﬃculty, seeing diﬃ-
culty, low communication ability, and being overactive have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on
children’s probability of being held back in kindergarten. Family risk factors, such as
living with a single parent or no parent and parents’ highest education being less than
high school, are also positively correlated with the probability of being held back.
Very interestingly, the coeﬃcient of SES has a positive sign.19 That is, conditional
on the other covariates, including pretreatment test scores, higher family SES is likely
to increase a child’s probability of repeating kindergarten. One possible explanation
could be that an extra year of kindergarten is more aﬀordable, or the opportunity
cost is lower for high SES families. Note that the relationship is negative without
conditioning on pretreatment test scores, which implies that family SES is highly cor-
related with children’s academic performance, and children from higher SES families
tend to perform better and hence are less likely to be held back. Whereas when they
18Receiving individualized education could be endogenous; however, treating this variable as endogenous does not
aﬀect our conclusions in this section. In particular, we re-estimate our model, excluding this variable. The estimates
are close to the current ones. As will be shown, the ATT estimates also do not change much. This is probably because
only about 2.6% of children have individualized education.
19Although this coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant, the coeﬃcients for SES and parents’ highest education are jointly
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Since parents’ highest education is one component of SES, joint signiﬁcance should be
considered.
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perform equally poorly, children from the high SES families are more likely to accept
an extra year of kindergarten.
As shown in the last row of Table A3-(1), the correlation of the errors in the school
selection and retention equations is -0.275. A Wald test rejects the null hypothesis
that the two errors are independent. Therefore, unobservables (e.g., low parents’
involvement or willingness to invest in their children’s education) that make children
more likely to attend non-retention schools also make them more likely to be held
back if there is an exogenous change in their school policies regarding kindergarten
retention. Estimation with just the multiple retention policy instrument produces a
similar correlation, while using just the travel mode instruments also yields a negative
but insigniﬁcant correlation. Considering the travel mode instruments are relatively
weak, the correlation of the two latent errors could be imprecisely estimated in this
case.
2.5.2 Estimated Treatment Eﬀects
The estimated average retention eﬀects on the retained kindergarteners’ academic
performance are reported in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Table 5.1 summarizes the CF esti-
mates. Table 5.2 presents the NNM estimates. The following discusses them both in
detail.
The ﬁrst column of Table 5.1 allows selection into retention schools to be non-
random; i.e., the kindergarten retention policy can be endogenous, so the CF estima-
tion proposed in the previous section is applied to the full model; the second column
assumes selection into retention schools is random, and so the retention policy is ex-
ogenous. The corresponding CF estimation sets to zero σSD, σ0S,and σ1S, which are
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the covariances between the school selection equation error and the errors in both
the retention equation and the test score equation. Also reported in Table 5.1 are
two sets of OLS estimates. The ﬁrst controls for pre-treatment test scores, while the
second does not. OLS corresponds to the speciﬁcation that sets to zero all the error
correlations across equations.
Column 1 in Table 5.1 shows that retained children on average scored 0.552 stan-
dard deviations higher in the ﬁrst-grade reading, and 0.547 standard deviations higher
in the ﬁrst-grade math than they would have scored, had they been socially promoted.
These represent 14.5% and 13.9% increases, respectively. These gains in reading and
math scores decrease to 0.176 standard deviations and 0.464 standard deviations,
respectively, when the kindergarten retainees are in third grade, which corresponds
to increases of 2.8% and 8.5%. The eﬀect on the third-grade reading score is not
statistically signiﬁcant at any conventional level. The full estimation results for test
score equations are provided in the Appendix.
Table 5.1 The Average Retention Eﬀects on the Retained Kindergarteners’ Academic Performance
by CF and OLS
CF (1) CF (2) OLS (1) OLS (2)
Retention policy
endogenous
Retention policy
exogenous
With pre-
treatment score
Without pre-
treatment score
1st grade
reading
0.552∗∗∗
(0.129)
0.610∗∗∗
(0.130)
0.399∗∗∗
(0.043)
-0.259∗∗∗
(0.058)
3rd grade
reading
0.176
(0.178)
0.277
(0.181)
0.256∗∗∗
(0.056)
-0.247∗∗∗
(-0.223)
1st grade
math
0.547∗∗∗
(0.134)
0.526∗∗∗
(0.140)
0.487∗∗∗
(0.049)
-0.223∗∗∗
(0.061)
3rd grade
math
0.464∗∗∗
(0.196)
0.555∗∗∗
(0.200)
0.399∗∗∗
(0.052)
-0.222∗∗∗
(0.060)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; ∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.)
The CF estimation in column 2, which assumes selection into retention schools
is random, generally shows larger eﬀects, particularly in the third grade test scores.
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Since retention school children may have advantages over non-retention school chil-
dren in terms of unobserved parental characteristics, such as parents’ involvement
and preference, failure to balance these unobserved diﬀerences could result in over-
estimates of the retention eﬀect as seen in column 2. Further, the impact of unob-
served parents’ characteristics may accumulate over time, which may be the reason
why the diﬀerences in third grade test scores are more signiﬁcant.
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 5.1 report OLS estimates. OLS without controlling
for pre-treatment test scores produces the widely documented negative sign of the
treatment eﬀect. Adding pre-treatment test scores as regressors to the OLS switches
the sign to positive. However, the estimated treatment eﬀects are mostly still smaller
than the CF estimates that account for selection eﬀects.
Table 5.2 The Average Retention Eﬀects on the Retained Kindergarteners’ Academic Performance by NNM
NNM (1) NNM (2) NNM (3)
Retention policy
endogenous
Retention policy
exogenous
Retention policy
ignored
Source of matched
controls
Retention school
children
Non-retention
school children
All school children
1st grade reading 0.264∗∗∗
(0.041)
0.337∗∗∗
(0.046)
0.265∗∗∗
(0.041)
3rd grade reading 0.060
(0.054)
0.176∗∗∗
(0.063)
0.080
(0.054)
1st grade math 0.473∗∗∗
(0.044)
0.470∗∗∗
(0.050)
0.472∗∗∗
(0.044)
3rd grade math 0.162∗∗∗
(0.052)
0.236∗∗∗
(0.059)
0.186∗∗∗
(0.052)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; ∗∗∗ Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Table 5.2 provides NNM estimates assuming selection into retention schools is
either non-random or random (column 1 and 2). It also presents NNM estimates
when the retention policy is ignored (column 3). When selection into retention schools
is assumed non-random, NNM is conducted within retention schools; i.e., retained
children are matched to their promoted peers only in retention schools. This within
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school type matching can eliminate the selection bias if the selection eﬀect of the
kindergarten retention policy is not heterogeneous; otherwise, it may still reduce the
selection bias.
When selection into retention schools is assumed random, the exogenous change in
the kindergarten retention policy serves as a natural experiment. NNM in this case
is conducted across school types; i.e., the retained children in retention schools are
matched to promoted children in non-retention schools.
When selection into diﬀerent schools is completely ignored, the retained children
are matched with promoted children from all schools. This corresponds to the case
where school type information is not observed.
Compared with the CF estimates in Table 5.1, the NNM estimates in Table 5.2
show smaller eﬀects. Recall we match children on their ages at kindergarten entry,
not their ages at the time of tests, so retained children are about one year older
than their promoted matches. Considering that age may have a nonnegative eﬀect on
test scores, if it were possible to account for this age eﬀect, the estimated retention
eﬀects by matching should be even smaller than those reported in Table 5.2. This
further supports our conjecture that matching fails to balance relevant unobserved
diﬀerences between retained and promoted children and so tends to underestimate
retention eﬀects.
As discussed earlier with CF, comparing columns 1 and 2 in Table 5.2 also shows
that when selection into diﬀerent schools is assumed random NNM generates larger
eﬀects than when it is assumed non-random. Not surprisingly, in column 3 when
selection into diﬀerent schools is ignored, we observe that matching over the pooled
sample yields retention eﬀects that are larger than those from within school type
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matching but smaller than those from between school type matching.
Although the estimated retention eﬀects from CF and NNM diﬀer in size, both
indicate positive but diminishing eﬀects of kindergarten retention on the retained
children’s test scores.20 In contrast with much of the existing literature, the positive
eﬀects we ﬁnd may be due in part to our particular choice of models. Besides speciﬁ-
cations, two other factors are worth emphasizing, namely, diﬀerences in samples and
test scores.
Unlike most existing studies, which draw samples from local school districts, this
study uses a nationally representative sample. In addition, we adopt IRT test scores
from a longitudinal study, which are specially designed to reveal children’s true cog-
nitive levels and are comparable across diﬀerent waves of surveys. This is important
because an accurate estimation of retention eﬀects relies on the accuracy of test scores
as a measure of children’s true cognitive levels and their comparability before and af-
ter the retention treatment. In contrast, many existing studies either do not control
for the pre-treatment cognitive level or use test scores from some other source as a
proxy.
2.6 Conclusions and Policy implications
Motivated by the growing discrepancy between educational practice and research
ﬁndings, this paper examines the eﬀects of kindergarten retention on the retained chil-
dren’s later academic performance using a recently collected nationally representative
sample from the US.
The primary research question investigated is whether the retained children actu-
20The estimated ATT for ﬁrst and third grade reading and math scores when excluding individualized education
plan are 0.535, 0.152, 0.527, and 0.409, respectively.
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ally did better than they would have done, had they been socially promoted. Other
issues explored include non-random selection of the kindergarten retention policy, and
the role of unobserved child, family, and school characteristics in selection into the
retention treatment.
This paper models the retention treatment as a binary choice with sample selec-
tion. This retention model explicitly takes into account the non-random selection of
children into diﬀerent types of schools, i.e., retention vs. non-retention schools. The
retention treatment dummy then shows up in the test score equation as an endoge-
nous regressor with a correlated random coeﬃcient, which captures the heterogeneity
of treatment eﬀects. A control function estimator is derived and applied to the result-
ing double-hurdle treatment model. As a comparison, a nearest neighbor matching
analysis is also conducted. Both the parametric control function approach and the
nonparametric matching method are implemented under a variety of assumptions
regarding selection into retention schools.
Findings from this study show that repeating kindergarten has positive eﬀects on
the retained children’s later academic performance; i.e., the retained children would
do worse in terms of the ﬁrst and third grade test scores, were they socially promoted.
Our results also suggest that these eﬀects diminish over time. For example, while the
positive eﬀect on the retainees’ math test scores is still signiﬁcant up to third grade,
the eﬀect on the reading test scores is not.
Comparison of the results from the control function and matching approaches
shows that unobserved child, family, and school characteristics that aﬀect a child’s
probability of repeating kindergarten also aﬀect his academic performance. Even con-
trolling for an extensive set of observables, matching fails to balance the unobserved
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diﬀerences between retained and promoted children, and so tends to underestimate
the retention eﬀect. This suggests a more cautious interpretation of the mainstream
conclusions about retention eﬀects in the existing research.
Results from this study should encourage researchers, education professionals, and
legislators to take a more optimistic attitude regarding kindergarten retention. Specif-
ically, it is shown that holding the low achieving kindergarteners back provides a boost
in their academic performance, although the eﬀect may wear oﬀ over time. That is,
kindergarten retention may give lagging children a chance to make up, if not catch
up.
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2.7 Appendix
Table A1 Description of Explanatory Variables
Explanatory Variable Description
D A dummy indicating whether a child was retained in kindergarten.
K1 math Math IRT test score at the end of the ﬁrst year kindergarten (at the
beginning of the treatment).
K1 reading Reading IRT test score at the end of the ﬁrst year kindergarten (at
the beginning of the treatment).
White A dummy indicating whether a child is non-Hispanic white.
Female A dummy indicating whether a child is female.
Age-at-test A child’s chronological age at the time of test, in months.
Age-at-entry A child’s chronological age at kindergarten entrance, in months.
Hearing diﬃculty A dummy indicating whether a child has diﬃculty in hearing speeches.
Seeing diﬃculty A dummy indicating whether a child has diﬃculty in seeing far objects
or letters on paper.
Communication ability A dummy indicating whether a child pronounces words, communicates
with others less well than the same-age children.
Overactive A dummy indicating whether a child is overactive.
Problem solving ability A dummy indicating whether a child’s ability to learn, to think, and
to solve problems is below average among same-age children.
Disabled A dummy indicating whether a child is disabled.
IEP A dummy indicating whether a child received individualized education
from school.
Parental educational
expectation
A dummy indicating whether parents expect their children to have
high school or lower education.
SES Family social economic status. Details about how it is created can be
found in ECLS-K user’s manual.
Parents’ highest education Three dummies representing less than high school, high school or some
college (the default), and bachelor’s degree or above education.
Family type A dummy indicating whether a child is from a single/no parent family.
All-day K A dummy indicating whether the kindergarten is all-day.
Private K A dummy indicating whether the kindergarten is private.
School received Title 1 Funds A dummy indicating whether the school received federal Title I funds.
Survey regions Four dummies representing the West, South, Midwest, and Northeast
(the default) survey regions.
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Table A2 Kindergarten Enrollment Age Cutoﬀ Dates by State21
State Kindergarten enrollment
cutoﬀ date
State Kindergarten enrollment
cutoﬀ date
Alabama Sept. 1 Nebraska Oct. 15
Alaska Aug. 15 Nevada Sept. 30
Arizona Sept. 1 New Hampshire LEA Option
Arkansas Sept. 15 New Jersey LEA Option
California Dec. 2 New Mexico before Sept. 1
Colorado LEA Option New York LEA Option
Connecticut Jan. 1 North Carolina Oct. 16
Delaware Aug. 31 North Dakota Sept. 1
District of Columbia Dec. 31 Ohio Sept. 30 or Aug. 1
Florida Sept. 1 Oklahoma Sept. 1
Georgia by Sept. 1 Oregon Sept. 1
Hawaii Dec. 31a Pennsylvania LEA Option
Idaho Sept. 1 Puerto Rico Aug. 31
Illinois Sept. 1 Rhode Island Sept. 1
Indiana Jul. 1 South Carolina Sept. 1
Iowa Sept. 15 South Dakota Sept. 1
Kansas Aug. 31 Tennessee Sept. 30
Kentucky Oct. 1 Texas Sept. 1
Louisiana Sept. 30 Utah Sept. 2
Maine Oct. 15 Vermont Jan. 1b
Maryland Oct. 31c Virgin Islands Dec. 31
Massachusetts LEA Option Virginia Sept. 30
Michigan Dec. 1 Washington Aug. 31
Minnesota Sept. 1 West Virginia Sept. 1
Mississippi Sept. 1 Wisconsin Sept. 1
Missouri Aug. 1d Wyoming Sept. 15
Montana Sept. 10
aIn 2006-07, the date changed to on or before Aug. 1
bIn Vermont, districts may set the enrollment age cutoﬀ date anywhere between Aug. 31 and Jan. 1 of the same
school year.
cIn 2005-06, this changed to Sept. 30. In 2006-07, it changed to Sept.1.
dLEA option between Aug. 1 and Oct. 1 for metropolitan districts.
21Source: State Note by the Education Commission of the States (ECS), 2005
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Table A3-(1) The Retention Model – Using both the Multiple Retention Policy and School Travel Mode
Instruments
Retention Treatment School Selection
Multiple retentions allowed in elementary school:
Yes
1.11 (.050)∗∗∗
Unknown -.139 (.055)∗∗∗
School travel modes:
Riding a bus
.164 (.063)∗∗∗
Dropped oﬀ by a parent .307 (.061)∗∗∗
Dropped oﬀ by a day care provider .103(.120)
Other .026 (.260)
K enrollment cutoﬀ date -.185(.031)∗∗∗ .037 (.013)∗∗∗
K1 math -.370(.093)∗∗∗ -.012 (.026)
K1 reading -.187(.105) .047 (.025)∗∗
White(non-Hispanic only) .222(.091)∗∗ .172 (.041)∗∗∗
Female -.502 (.080)∗∗∗ -.022 (.036)
Age-at-entry -1.37 (.171)∗∗∗ -.334 (.100)∗∗∗
Age-at-entry squared .009 (.001)∗∗∗ .002 (.001)∗∗∗
Hearing diﬃculty .232 (.204) .152 (.127)
Seeing diﬃculty .029 (.150) -.170 (.084)∗∗
Communication ability:
Less well than same-age children
.004 (.116) -.112 (.066)
Overactive .109 (.105) -.156 (.053)∗∗∗
Problem solving ability:
Less well than same-age children
.350 (.118)∗∗∗ .091 (.082)
Disabled .459 (.106)∗∗∗ .014 (.062)
IEP .655 (.155)∗∗∗ .142 (.112)
Parental educational expectation:
High school or less
.224 (.097)∗∗ .078 (.054)
Family type: Single/no parent .153 (.097)∗ -.104 (.049)∗∗
SES .110 (.089) .038 (.042)
Parents’ highest education:
Bachelor’s degree or above
-.021 (.112) .108 (.054)∗
Less than high school .508 (.146)∗∗∗ .059 (.083)
All-day K .190 (.080)∗∗ -.105 (.040)∗∗
Private K .557 (.086)∗∗∗ -.073 (.049)∗
School received Title 1 Funds -.43 (.085) -.396 (.040)∗∗∗
West -.008 (.121) .132 (.060)∗∗
South .001 (.108) -.253 (.058)∗∗∗
Midwest -.014 (.117) .155 (.055)∗∗∗
Constant 50.4 (5.77)∗∗∗ 11.6 (3.29)∗∗∗
Correlation of the two Eq.s’ errors -.278 (.124)∗∗
Note: ∗Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5% level; ∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
94
Table A3-(2) The Retention Model – Using the Multiple Retention Policy Instrument
Retention Treatment School Selection
Multiple retentions allowed in elementary school:
Yes
1.09 (.050)∗∗∗
Unknown -.135 (.055)∗∗
K enrollment cutoﬀ date -.185 (.031)∗∗∗ .037 (.013)∗∗∗
K1 math -.371 (.094)∗∗∗ -.012 (.026)
K1 reading -.186 (.105)∗ .047 (.025)∗
White(Non-Hispanic only) .224 (.091)∗∗ .170 (.041)∗∗∗
Female -.503 (.080)∗∗∗ -.023 (.036)
Age-at-entry -1.37 (.171)∗∗∗ -.335 (.100)∗∗∗
Age-at-entry squared .009∗(.001)∗∗ .003 (.001)∗∗∗
Hearing diﬃculty .232 (.204) .147 (.126)
Seeing diﬃculty .028 (.150) -.166 (.083)∗∗
Communication ability:
Less well than same-age children
-.005 (.117) -.113 (.066)∗
Overactive .108 (.105) -.153 (.053)∗∗∗
Problem solving ability:
Less well than same-age children
.351 (.118)∗∗∗ .084 (.081)
Disabled .459 (.107)∗∗∗ .012 (.062)
IEP .655 (.155)∗∗∗ .144 (.111)
Parental educational expectation:
High school or less
.225 (.097)∗∗ .067 (.054)
Family type: Single/no parent .509 (.147)∗∗∗ -.122 (.047)∗∗∗
SES .109 (.089) .048 (.041)
Parents’ highest education:
Bachelor’s degree or above
.153 (.097) .106 (.054)∗
Less than high school -.021 (.112) .045 (.083)
All-day K .189 (.080)∗∗ -.099 (.040)∗∗
Private K .558 (.086)∗∗∗ -.017 (.047)
School received Title 1 Funds -.144 (.085)∗ -.404 (.040)∗∗∗
West -.007 (.122) .171 (.057)∗∗∗
South .002 (.108) -.211 (.057)∗∗∗
Midwest -.014 (.117) .172 (.055)∗∗∗
Constant 50.4 (5.78)∗ 11.8 (3.30)∗∗∗
Correlation of the two Eq.s’ errors -.263 (.130)∗∗
Note: ∗Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5% level; ∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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Table A3-(3) The Retention Model – Using the School Travel Mode Instruments
Retention Treatment School Selection
School travel modes:
Riding a bus
.152 (.066)∗∗
Dropped oﬀ by a parent .287 (.065)∗∗∗
Dropped oﬀ by a day care provider .058 (.120)
Other .031 (.254)
K enrollment cutoﬀ date -.185 (.031)∗∗∗ .017 (.012)
K1 math -.376 (.095)∗∗∗ -.011 (.025)
K1 reading -.164 (.105) .042 (.024)∗
White(non-Hispanic only) .235 (.095)∗∗ .110 (.039)∗∗∗
Female -.520 (.082)∗∗∗ -.025 (.035)
Age-at-entry -1.38 (.176)∗∗∗ -.306 (.096)∗∗∗
Age-at-entry squared .009 (.001)∗∗∗ .002 (.001)∗∗∗
Hearing diﬃculty .250 (.208) .165 (.122)
Seeing diﬃculty .034 (.154) -.195 (.081)∗∗
Communication ability:
Less well than same-age children
.037 (.118) -.100 (.064)
Overactive .086 (.109) -.169 (.052)∗∗∗
Problem solving ability:
Less well than same-age children
.366 (.120)∗∗∗ .057 (.079)
Disabled .417 (.108)∗∗∗ .009 (.060)
IEP .653 (.160)∗∗∗ .087 (.107)
Parental educational expectation:
High school or less
.239 (.100)∗∗ .079 (.052)
Family type: Single/no parent .183 (.099)∗ -.091 (.046)∗∗
SES .097 (.091) .027 (.040)
Parents’ highest education:
Bachelor’s degree or above
.009 (.114) .107 (.052)∗∗
Less than high school .526 (.153)∗∗∗ .061 (.081)
All-day K .188 (.082)∗∗ -.106 (.039)∗∗∗
Private K .557 (.088)∗∗∗ -.110 (.046)∗∗
School received Title 1 Funds -.130 (.089) -.354 (.038)∗∗∗
West -.037 (.124) .018 (.058)
South -.008 (.111) -.079 (.054)
Midwest -.023 (.119) .119 (.053)∗∗
Constant 50.8 (5.94)∗∗∗ 11.1 (3.16)∗∗∗
Correlation of the two Eq.s’ errors -.168 (.177)
Note: ∗Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5% level; ∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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Table A4 The Test Score Equations
1st grade
reading
3rd grade
reading
1st grade
math
3rd grade
math
D .727 (.092)∗∗∗ .551 (.107)∗∗∗ .746 (.094)∗∗∗ .686 (.099)∗∗∗
K1 math .182 (.010)∗∗∗ .324 (.012)∗∗∗ .643 (.010)∗∗∗ .565 (.011)∗∗∗
K1 reading .596 (.009)∗∗∗ .230 (.011)∗∗∗ .081 (.010)∗∗∗ .079 (.010)∗∗∗
White .035 (.017)∗∗ .224 (.019)∗∗∗ .156 (.017)∗∗∗ .171 (.018)∗∗∗
Female .043 (.014)∗∗∗ .115 (.017)∗∗∗ -.124 (.015)∗∗∗ -.235 (.016)∗∗∗
Age-at-test .095 (.068) -.034 (.032) .138 (.070)∗∗ -.003 (.030)
Age-at-test squared -.001 (.000) .000 (.004) -.001 (.000)∗∗ -.006 (.004)
Hearing diﬃculty .024 (.049) -.043 (.058) -.093 (.051)∗ -.062 (.054)
Seeing diﬃculty -.026 (.036) -.008 (.042) -.006 (.037) .005 (.039)
Communication ability: Less
well than same-age children
-.112 (.027)∗∗∗ -.188 (.032)∗∗∗ .037 (.028) -.040 (.029)
Overactive .007 (.023) -.042 (.027) .000 (.024) -.043 (.025)∗
Problem solving ability: Less
well than same-age children
-.099 (.034)∗∗∗ -.197 (.039)∗∗∗ -.185 (.035)∗∗∗ -.243 (.036)∗∗∗
Disabled -.042 (.025)∗ -.028 (.030) -.047 (.026)∗∗ -.013 (.028)
IEP -.111 (.046)∗∗ -.304 (.054)∗∗∗ -.207 (.048)∗∗∗ -.299 (.050)∗∗∗
Parental educational expecta-
tion: High school or less
-.107 (.022)∗∗∗ -.199 (.026)∗∗∗ -.072 (.023)∗∗∗ -.178(.024)∗∗∗
SES .050 (.016)∗∗∗ .166 (.018)∗∗∗ .078 (.016)∗∗∗ .129 (.017)∗∗∗
Parents’ highest education:
Bachelor’s degree or above
.038 (.021)∗ -.056 (.041) .031 (.022) .040 (.023)∗
Less than high school -.087 (.035)∗∗ .036 (.025) .055 (.036) .038 (.038)
Family type: Single/no parent -.033 (.020) -.067 (.024)∗∗∗ -.007 (.021) -.069 (.022)∗∗∗
All-day K -.075 (.016)∗∗∗ -.085 (.018)∗∗∗ -.053 (.016)∗∗∗ -.095 (.017)∗∗∗
Private K .026 (.018) -.013 (.021) -.058 (.019)∗∗∗ -.197 (.020)∗∗∗
School received Title 1 Funds -.045(.015)∗∗∗ -.007 (.017) -.044 (.015)∗∗∗ -.025 (.016)
West -.083(.023)∗∗∗ -.041 (.026) -.029 (.023) .021 (.025)
South -.001 (.021) .029 (.025) .073 (.022)∗∗∗ .059 (.023)∗∗
Midwest -.070 (.021)∗∗∗ .005 (.024) .006 (.021) .009 (.022)
λ1 -.257 (.051)
∗∗∗ -.248 (.059)∗∗∗ -.169 (.052)∗∗∗ -.179 (.054)∗∗∗
λ2 -.254 (.243) -.110 (.284) -.229 (.251) -.353 (.264)
λ3 -.153 (.092)
∗ .056 (.106) -.045 (.095) -.042 (.098)
λ4 -.169 (.046)
∗∗∗ -.040 (.054) -.003 (.048) .010 (.050)
λ5 .045 (.017)
∗∗∗ .044 (.019)∗∗ -.014 (.017) .025 (.018)
Constant -3.77 (2.96) .038 (.064) -6.05 (3.06)∗∗ .212 (.060)∗∗∗
Note: 1. ∗Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5% level;∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.2. Using the
estimated coeﬃcients of λ1, λ2, ..., and λ5,one could construct 5 equations in 5 unknowns σSD, σ1S , σ0S , σ1D,
and σ0D, so in theory one could then combine these covariances with estimated error variances to obtain
correlations between errors in any two equations. However, these nuisance parameters are likely to be poorly
estimated partly because these errors are either latent (εS , εD) or partially latent(εY 1, εY 0), so we do not
calculate these correlations.
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CHAPTER III
Endogenous Regressor Binary Choice Models Without
Instruments, With an Application to Migration
3.1 Introduction
This paper proves identiﬁcation of a semiparametric binary choice model that con-
tains an endogenous or mismeasured regressor, when no outside instrumental variable
is available. A corresponding estimator, an easy test for endogeneity, and an appli-
cation to migration in the United States are also provided. This paper generalizes
identiﬁcation based on functional form, showing identiﬁcation even when the error
distributions and the endogenous regressor have unknown functional forms.
In practice, identiﬁcation that relies upon instruments is generally preferable to
identiﬁcation based on functional form. However, instruments are sometimes diﬃcult
to ﬁnd, so it is useful to know when identiﬁcation is possible without instruments and
to be able to test for endogeneity in the absence of instruments.
3.2 The Model
Consider a binary choice model
(3.1) D = I (α +X ′β + Y γ + ε ≥ 0) ,
102
where I (·) is an indicator function that equals one if its argument is true, and zero
otherwise; D is a dummy dependent variable; ε is a mean zero error term with a
possibly unknown distribution; X is a vector of exogenous regressors; and Y is a po-
tentially endogenous or mismeasured regressor. The goal is to identify the parameters
α, β, and γ along with the error distribution. Any features of the model, such as
choice probabilities and marginal eﬀects of covariates, can also be calculated.
Here equation (3.1) is assumed to be the equation of interest, which could come
from economic theory, whereas how Y is determined is unknown or left as ﬂexible as
possible. Therefore, the model for Y is nonparametric. Let G(X) = E(Y | X) for
some possibly unknown function G and deﬁne U = Y −G (X), then
(3.2) Y = G (X) + U
where U is an error term with a possibly unknown distribution and E(U | X) = 0. U
could be heteroscedastic or otherwise depend on X. The errors ε and U are assumed
to be correlated, resulting in endogeneity of Y in the binary choice equation.
If some element of β were known to be zero (an exclusion restriction), the corre-
sponding covariate in X would be an instrument. Special cases of my model where G
is parametric with an instrument or exclusion include Newey (1987) and Rivers and
Vuong (1988). Newey, Powell, and Vella (1999) and Blundell and Powell (2004) are
more general than my model, except that they also require an instrument.
In this paper I show model (3.1) is generally semiparametrically identiﬁed without
an exclusion, even if the function G and the distributions of ε and U are unknown.
Identiﬁcation arises primarily from nonlinearity in the unknown function G.
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3.3 Identiﬁcation
Assume the endogeneity of Y can be written as
(3.3) ε = λU + V,
where λ is some unknown constant that determines the extent of correlation between
ε and Y , and V is a mean zero error term that is independent of U and X. This
form of endogeneity is not uncommon. For example, equation (3.3) always holds
when ε and U are jointly normally distributed, by letting λ = E (εU) /E (U2) and
V = ε−λU . It could also follow directly from economic theories that entail triangular
systems. For example, Y could represent a precondition or ﬁrst-stage decision and
D, a follow-up decision in which the error term equals the unobservables determining
Y plus new shocks.
ASSUMPTIONS: The joint distribution of Y , D, andX is identiﬁed, and E (Y | X)
exists. Equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3) hold. Conditional on X, the error U has a
continuous mean zero distribution with a support on the whole real line. The error V
has a continuous mean zero distribution and is independent of U and X. E
(
X˜X˜ ′
)
exists and is nonsingular for X˜ = [1, X ′, G(X)]′. The function G and the distribution
functions of V and U given X may be unknown. Either λ+ γ = 0 or the distribution
function of V is known.
Having the joint distribution of Y , D, and X be identiﬁed is easily satisﬁed by
assuming that we have n independently, identically distributed observations on these
variables, with n→∞.
Continuity of U generally holds if Y is continuously distributed. The assumption
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that U has a real line support is satisﬁed if, for example, U is normal, and generally
holds if Y can take on any value. This assumption can be relaxed, but identiﬁcation
will still require U to have a large support as described in the Appendix.
The assumption that E
(
X˜X˜ ′
)
exists and is nonsingular means that if we had a
linear regression model where the regressors were G(X) and X, then the regression
would not suﬀer from perfect collinearity. That is, G(X) must be a nonlinear function
of X. Given that the index function for D is linear in X, for identiﬁcation, G(X) could
be quadratic in one or more elements of X, say W . However, if W 2 also appears in
X, then G(X) would have to be some function of W other than a linear or quadratic
form.
The assumption that λ+ γ = 0 is testable because λ+ γ = 0 if and only if E(D |
X,Y ) = E(D | X). Many tests of whether a variable belongs to a nonparametric
regression like this exist. A relatively early example is Lewbel (1995).
Finally, I assume V has variance one. This assumption is without loss of generality
because the coeﬃcients and error term in binary choice models are identiﬁed up to
an arbitrary positive constant; i.e., the model is unchanged if the error term and all
coeﬃcients are scaled by any positive number.
THEOREM: If the assumptions stated above hold, then α, β, γ, the function
G(X), and the distributions of U and V (and hence of ε) are all semiparametrically
identiﬁed.
This theorem (proved in the Appendix) provides identiﬁcation of the entire model.
Therefore, any features of the model, for example, marginal eﬀects of X and Y , are
also identiﬁed.
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To see that identiﬁcation fails when G (X) is linear in X, and U and ε are normal,
substitute G(X) + U for Y in equation (3.1) and rewrite it as D = I(α + X ′β +
G(x)γ + Uγ + ε ≥ 0). When G(X) is a linear function, for any value of γ, there
are always corresponding α and β that give the same index function plus a standard
normal error; i.e., diﬀerent combinations of α, β, and γ can yield the same probit
model for D, so the coeﬃcients are not uniquely determined.
3.4 Estimation and Testing
Assume we have n independent and identically distributed observations of X,
Y , and D. Given Theorem 1, existing estimators for binary choice models with
endogenous regressors when there are exclusion restrictions can generally be applied
in our case. Here I adopt control function based estimators to show the application
of our identiﬁcation results.
First estimate G using a kernel regression and obtain Û by,
(3.4) Ûi = Yi −
∑n
j=1 K(
Xj−Xi
h
)Yj∑n
j=1 K(
Xj−Xi
h
)
for i = 1, ..., n,
where K is a kernel function and h is a bandwidth parameter. Note this kernel
estimator can be used with both discrete and continuous X data (Li and Racine,
2004). Then plug Û in the D equation, and estimate the endogeneity corrected
binary choice model,
(3.5) D = I(α +X ′β + Y γ + Ûλ+ V ≥ 0).
Any estimator that would be consistent for a binary choice model under the as-
sumption that the error V is independent of the covariates X, Y , and Û can be
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applied here. This paper estimates equation (3.5) both parametrically and semipara-
metrically. The parametric approach is simply to estimate an ordinary probit of D
with covariates 1, X, Y , and Û . The semiparametric approach adopts the eﬃcient
estimator of Klein and Spady (1993), which makes no distribution assumption on V .
The Klein and Spady estimator (KS) is essentially a maximum likelihood estimator
where the probability distribution function is estimated using a nonparametric re-
gression. KS does not identify the location α and requires a scale normalization on
coeﬃcients rather than the error variance. If desired, the location and scale based on
a mean zero and variance one nonparametric error could be recovered using Lewbel
(1997).
These are two-step estimators of a ﬁnite number of parameters with a nonpara-
metric ﬁrst step. Consistency of the estimates follows from identiﬁcation, uniform
consistency of kernel regressions, and consistency of KS or probit. Regularity condi-
tions for root n asymptotically normal asymptotic limiting distributions with these
types of estimators are provided by chapter 8 of Newey and McFadden (1994). This
estimator is numerically simple and fast, so bootstrapping for standard errors is com-
putationally feasible. Theorem B in Chen, Linton, and Van Keilegom (2003) provides
suﬃcient regularity conditions for bootstrapping two-step estimators with a nonpara-
metric ﬁrst step.
To test for endogeneity, one may just look at the ordinary t-statistic for λ. By
equation (3.3), λ = 0 under the null hypothesis of no endogeneity. Unlike other
inferences, one does not have to account for the ﬁrst stage estimation error of Û
to perform this test, because under the null hypothesis Û drops out of the model
(see Newey and McFadden (1994), sections 6 and 8, speciﬁcally Theorem 6.2). For
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example, when we estimate equation (3.5) using probit, the t-statistic from the probit
estimation itself provides valid inference for testing if λ = 0.
3.5 Empirical Application
Let D indicate if a worker moves (migrates) to another state in the United States.
Labor income Y is likely to be endogenous in the migration model, and it is diﬃcult
to obtain a suitable instrument because anything that aﬀects wages may also aﬀect
expected wage gains and hence the decision to move. Existing research shows that
migration probabilities decrease with age and the eﬀect is linear or near linear among
working age people. For example, Burda (1993) shows “age is strongly negatively
associated with the desire to migrate (quadratic terms were insigniﬁcant).” This
is also consistent with the human capital theory of migration: workers migrate to
maximize expected earnings; the older an individual is the shorter his remaining
working life, and hence the lower the expected present discounted value of his wage
gains that might result from moving. In contrast, income itself is generally found
to be nonlinear in age. The underlying theory can be traced back to Mincer (1974).
This nonlinearity in G suﬃces for identiﬁcation, even if it has unknown form, and
even if the joint error distribution in the labor income and migration equations are
also unknown.
This paper draws a sample from the 1990 wave of the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) data. The analysis focuses on male household heads who are not
students and who have positive labor income during 1989 - 1990. The top 1% highest
earning individuals are dropped to reduce the impact of outliers. The analysis is
further restricted to those 22 to 69 years old, consistent with a downward migration-
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age proﬁle. These restrictions yield a sample of 4,582 observations.
To avoid having a sample that is too unbalanced (a small share of migrants), D
is based on a three-year migration probability; i.e., D = 1 if an individual changes
his state of residence during 1991 - 1993, and 0 otherwise. There are 796 migrants
in our sample. Y is deﬁned as the logarithm of average annual labor income in 1990
and 1989. The vector X includes age (22 - 69), a dummy indicating college or above
education (0, 1), the logarithm of family size (1 - 17), and the number of states an
individual ever lived in (1 - 8). Age, the number of states, and the logarithm of annual
labor income are divided by 10 to facilitate estimation. Unlike some existing studies,
homeownership is not included due to its potential endogeneity in both the income
and migration equations, though admittedly homeownership could be an important
predictor for migration.
To check the identifying assumptions, I non-parametrically regress the migration
dummy and the logarithm of labor income on all the covariates. Figure 1 shows the
nonparametric impacts of age on the migration probability and on the logarithm of
labor income, holding the other covariates ﬁxed at their means. As can be seen, the
migration-age proﬁle is close to linear while the income-age proﬁle has an inverse-U
shape. This nonlinearity of the labor income in age therefore suﬃces for identiﬁcation.
Considering that the monetary cost of migration might complicate the migration-
income relationship, I experimented with limiting the sample to individuals who would
not be deterred from moving by the cost, in particular, those whose household income
is above the poverty threshold. This did not change the estimation results much,
possibly because this paper focuses on workers.
The estimated coeﬃcients are presented in Table 1. These estimates are based
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Figure 1 Nonparametric age eﬀects on migration probabilities and on labor income
on three diﬀerent speciﬁcations: a simple probit assuming labor income is exogenous
and two endogenous income two-step estimators (kernel regression-probit and kernel
regression-KS). The bandwidth choice for the high-dimensional ﬁrst stage kernel re-
gression is obtained by cross-validation and for the one-dimensional KS estimator by
Silverman’s rule. Since KS can only identify coeﬃcients up to location and scale, the
coeﬃcient of the number of states is normalized to one. Note this is diﬀerent from the
scaling of the probit, so the estimated coeﬃcients in the probit (I and II in Table 1)
need to be divided by the coeﬃcient of the number of states to be comparable with the
KS estimates. Further, the last row of Table 1 reports the probability density at the
index mean (f(X¯ ′β)), which when multiplied by the coeﬃcients gives the marginal
eﬀects at the mean. Marginal eﬀects are invariant to scaling and so are comparable
across speciﬁcations.
As expected, age has a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect. Adding a quadratic term of
age to the migration equation does not produce a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, which further
conﬁrms that, conditional on the other covariates in the model, age has a linear or
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near linear impact on the migration probability.
The ﬁrst step error (Uˆ) has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the migration
probability. Based on the estimated coeﬃcients and density, the marginal eﬀects
of Uˆ in the two-step probit and KS are 0.447 and 0.582, respectively. Although
diﬀerent in size and level of signiﬁcance, both estimates suggest that labor income
(Y ) is endogenous in the migration choice (D) equation and unobservables, such as
personality traits, that result in higher earnings also increase migration propensity
ceteris paribus. The marginal eﬀects of labor income in the simple probit is -0.319,
in contrast to -0.729 in the two-step probit and -0.893 in the KS. Therefore, ignoring
the endogeneity of labor income leads to underestimation of the income eﬀect on the
migration probability. In addition, the similarity between the two-step probit and
KS estimates suggest that after controlling for endogeneity, normality is a reasonable
approximation for the true distribution of the latent error in the migration equation.
Table 1 Migration Binary Choice Model Estimates
Probit (I) Kernel Reg. –
Probit (II)
Kernel Reg. –
KS (III)
Constant 0.720 (0.235)∗∗∗ 2.260 (0.973)∗∗∗
Age -0.154 (0.021)∗∗∗ -0.154 (0.021)∗∗∗ -0.245 (0.061)∗∗∗
College education -0.024 (0.046) 0.062 (0.067) 0.112 (0.103)
Log (Family size) 0.013 (0.044) 0.060 (0.056) 0.131 (0.085)
# of states lived in 0.813 (0.141)∗∗∗ 0.801 (0.145)∗∗∗ 1.000† (0.000)
Log (Labor income) -1.272 (0.235)∗∗∗ -2.887 (1.020)∗∗∗ -5.382 (1.623)∗∗∗
Uˆ 1.779 (1.067)∗ 3.506 (1.028)∗∗∗
f(X¯ ′β) 0.251 (0.006)∗∗∗ 0.251 (0.006)∗∗∗ 0.166 (0.162)
Note: †The coeﬃcient of # of states lived in is normalized to one in the Kernel Regression - KS estimation.
Bootstrapped standard errors are in the parenthesis. ∗∗∗ Signiﬁcant at the 1% level; ∗ Signiﬁcant at the 10%
level.
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3.6 Conclusions
This paper shows the identiﬁcation of a binary choice model having an endogenous
regressor without relying on outside instruments or exclusion restrictions. A simple
control function type estimator is provided based on this identiﬁcation, which has a
nonparametric regression ﬁrst step and parametric or semiparametric binary choice
estimation second step. The ﬁrst step error is used as an additional covariate in the
second step. The ordinary t statistic for this added covariate provides a test for the
endogeneity of the suspected regressor.
I apply this estimator to analyze migration within the US among working age
people. Labor income before migration is potentially endogenous and no appropriate
instrument is available. Identiﬁcation of this binary choice migration model relies
on the fact that the migration probability among workers is close to linear in age
while labor income is nonlinear in age. Reasonable estimates are obtained due to
the suﬃcient non-linearity of the ﬁrst stage nonparametric regression. Adopting both
parametric estimation (probit) or semiparametric estimation (the Klein-Spady esti-
mator) in the second stage, I ﬁnd evidence that labor income is endogenous to the
migration choice and that ignoring this endogeneity leads to downward bias in the
estimated eﬀect of labor income on the migration probability.
3.7 Appendix
PROOF OF THEOREM:
G(X), U , and E (D | X,U) are identiﬁed by construction. Given independence
of V , E (D | X,U) = F [α +X ′β +G (X) γ + (λ+ γ)U ], where F is the distribution
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function of −V . Deﬁne H (U) = E (D | X = 0, U) = F [α +G (0) γ + (λ+ γ)U ],
then H is identiﬁed. Continuity of V implies that F and hence H are diﬀerentiable
and strictly monotonic, so dH (U) /dU is identiﬁed.
Case 1: λ + γ = 0. That is, dH (U) /dU is not zero everywhere. Without loss
of generality, assume λ + γ is positive (dH (U) /dU > 0); otherwise, one can always
replace Y with −Y to make (λ+ γ) > 0. Deﬁne Z = H−1 [E (D | X,U = 0)]. By
monotonicity of H and the real line support of U | X, the function H−1 exists and is
identiﬁed over the real line; i.e., Z is identiﬁed and
(3.6) Z = (λ+ γ)−1(X ′β +G(X)γ −G(0)γ).
(λ+γ)−1β, (λ+γ)−1γ, and (λ+γ)−1G(0)γ in equation (3.6) can then be identiﬁed by
linearly projecting Z on X, G (X), and 1. Then plug equation (3.6) into the model
D to get D = I [(λ+ γ)Z +G (0) γ + α + V ≥ 0]. E (D | Z) is identiﬁed and is the
distribution function of V˜ = − (λ+ γ)−1 (G(0)γ + α+ V ). The ﬁrst two moments of
this identiﬁed distribution function are − (λ+ γ)−1 (G(0)γ + α) and (λ+ γ)−2, which
along with the coeﬃcients in equation (3.6) identify β, γ, λ, and α. The distribution
of V is then identiﬁed, because 1 − E (D | α +X ′β +G (X) γ + (λ+ γ)U = −v) is
the distribution function of V evaluated at v. Given a whole real line or otherwise
large enough support of U so that v can take on any value of V , the distribution is
fully identiﬁed.
Case 2: λ+ γ = 0. In this case, D = I(α +X ′β +G(X)γ + V ≥ 0), E (D | X) =
F [α +X ′β +G (X) γ], and F−1 [E (D | X)] = α + X ′β + G (X) γ. The distribution
function of −V , F , is assumed known, so F−1 [E (D | X)] is identiﬁed. Linearly
projecting F−1 [E (D | X)] on 1, X, and G (X) then identiﬁes α, β, γ, and λ = −γ.
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Lastly, the distribution of ε is identiﬁed because ε = λU +V with U ⊥ V , and the
above analysis has shown that λ as well as the distributions of U and V are identiﬁed.
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